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# REFLECTIONS

ON

Monroe's View,

OF

THE CONDUCT OF THE EXECUTIVE,

AS PUBLISHED IN THE

*Gazette of the United States,*

UNDER THE SIGNATURE OF

SCIPIO. *pseud.*

*k*  
*In which the COMMERCIAL WARFARE of France  
is traced to the FRENCH FACTION IN THIS  
COUNTRY, as its Source, and the Motives of  
Opposition, &c.*

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# REFLECTIONS

ON

## Monroe's View.

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### No. I.

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I HAVE perused the publication of Mr. Monroe, late minister to the French Republic, which he has thought proper to call "a view of the conduct of the Executive on the foreign affairs of the United States, connected with the mission of the French Republic, during the years, 1794, 95, 96," and which he has illustrated with his instructions and correspondence and other authentic documents. Having been superceded by the appointment of Mr. Pinckney, the objects of the ex-minister are avowed to be, not merely to vindicate himself, or to retrieve his reputation, from the unfavourable impressions which his dismissal from office may have excited, and to fix a censure on the late President for this act, but principally to prove that the present misunderstanding between the United States, and the French Republic, and a rupture, should it happen, are attributable not to the directory of the French Republic but to our Executive, whose policy during the whole of the

European war is pronounced by him to be injurious to our national character and interests," "short sighted and bad." This last is a very serious charge, but it is not now for the first time brought forward. It has been the constant pursuit of the French faction in our country, to make this impression on the public mind, and in every shape it has been at one time or another attempted—That Mr. Monroe, whose policy relative to France I am ready to admit, has been at variance with the policy of the late President, from the commencement of his ministerial functions to the time of his recall; that Mr. Monroe, who it is not denied has been as true to his party as he could have been wished, should return to his native country, and endeavour to revive this antiquated complaint, has excited in me no surprise—Being discarded by the administration, no alternative remained but to endeavour to stand well with the opposition from whom he had never separated during the whole of his public employment. It will not be pretended to have been possible for him to have served with fidelity the executive and the opposition faction at the same time; and which he served the documents fully evince. A man cannot at the same time serve God and Mammon. This was the *difficult* station in which the late minister to France was placed, and the obvious course which he should have taken to have dispelled the difficulties, was either to have resigned his office, and adhered to the policy of his party, or to have abandoned his party and sincerely joined his endeavours in promoting the policy of the Executive. He did neither; but remaining in office his views were directed not by the policy of neutrality and independence, with regard to all nations which governed the President, but by a policy which should

place our Government under the care and protection of France; a policy that would have confided to the generosity of France, our claims upon Great Britain and Spain; a policy that degraded this country in the eyes of that Republic, as it tended to put the very being of the nation under its power, and to reduce us to the humble and helpless condition of Batavia. This is the view which the documents published by Mr. Monroe have presented to mind, to some of which I shall particularly refer in the course of the observations which they have suggested; from which it will appear that Mr. Monroe ought to have sooner been recalled, and it was the invariable and sincere endeavour of the Executive, to preserve the best possible terms with France, consistent with the peace and independence of this country.

But let me first enquire upon what principle, compatible with an honourable discharge of his duty, a *superceded Minister*, is warranted of his own accord in exposing to the foreign nation from whence he has been removed, and to the world, the confidential communications of his own nation? Is it not a violation of the faith upon which he undertook his office? If upon the dismissal of every public minister, one consequence is to be, the publication of the most private transactions of the nation, the valuable purposes of diplomatic agents for preserving the peace and promoting the good of society cannot be attained. To attain these, each nation will disclose to its own agents the means which it deems the most advisable to be used relative to its own interests, and for one nation to publish these while all the other nations conceal their own, must place the former upon an unequal and disadvantageous ground with them all. When



a public officer quits an office, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, he is not at the same time discharged from all the obligations which had been imposed on him in the course of official duty. If facts or public documents became known to him by reason of his office, in confidence, that they should remain undisclosed, his obligations to secrecy continue the same, whether he is in or out of office. The knowledge is communicated in the first instance upon an implied promise to observe secrecy until permission shall be granted to divulge. No permission was asked by Mr. Monroe to publish the *confidential correspondence*, between the President of the United States and their minister in France, and in doing this he appears to me to have committed a breach of duty for which he merits a more exemplary punishment than the silent disapprobation of the good and faithful.

What good at this juncture could the publication of these private documents promote?

From what motive has the publication proceeded? Was it designed to aid or to embarrass those measures of peace and conciliation with the French Republic, which are now in execution? Whatever may have been the motive, I am happy in knowing that if an offence has been committed which deserves to be punished, there is a constitutional mode of obtaining justice to the United States, and of deterring others from similar misbehaviour. To the consideration of the proper authorities, I shall therefore leave this illicit and unjustifiable procedure.

SCIPIO.



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No. II.

The reflections arising out of the authentic documents annexed to Monroe's view, which I shall present to the public, will relate principally to his diplomatic conduct. I might say that the general tenor of his actions, from the beginning to the end of his mission, no less servile to the ruling power of France, than disrespectful, if not disobedient, to the Executive of the United States, furnished sufficient cause for his recall. But I prefer stating particular instances of misconduct, and shall refer to the documents which prove them, this being the fairest mode of examining the subject.

The instances that have appeared to me most reprehensible, may be specified as follows:—

First—He represented to the committee of public safety, that he was not instructed to complain of the decree, which, dispensing with some articles of the treaty of amity and commerce, was attended with the most ruinous effects on the American commerce; and on a proper view of the proceedings of the Executive, this representation will be found unauthorized.

Secondly—Without any thing to warrant his opinion, he informed the committee of public safety, *that he well knew*, that if upon consideration, after the experiment made, it should be their opinion, that it produced any solid good to the Republic, to disregard the 23d and 24th articles of the treaty, the American government and his countrymen would not only bear with the departure from those articles with patience, but with pleasure.

Thirdly—He frequently represented in positive terms to the Committee of public safety, that Mr. Jay's mission was restrained to only two objects; to demand a compensation for spoliations, and a surrender of the western posts—whereas, his instructions stated that matter differently, informing him that the motives of the mission were to obtain compensation for spoliations and a surrender of the western posts, but not that his powers were limited to those objects only.

Fourthly—He promised to the Committee of public safety, indiscreetly, unnecessarily and improperly, to communicate to them the contents of the treaty negotiated by Mr. Jay with Great-Britain, so soon as they should be known to him; and before the treaty could possibly be sent to the President, and be either ratified or rejected, he sent a special messenger to London, to obtain a copy for the express purpose of submitting it to the ruling power in France, and pertinaciously refused information of the contents of the treaty, unless with a permission to communicate them according to his promise, to the Committee of public safety.

p. 42. Fifthly—He encouraged the French Republic in a project to obtain, by loan, a sum of money from the United States, to enable it to prosecute the war: a measure which his instructions positively forbade; which would inevitably have drawn them from a state of neutrality, and would have rendered them dependent on the fortunes of France, to which, from that time, they would have been inseparably united.

Sixthly—He neglected for a long space of time, to use with sincerity, diligence and prudence, the means which were put in his power by the President, for satisfying the Directory of France, that

the commercial treaty with Great-Britain, was proper and necessary for the peace and prosperity of the United States, and did not impair any prior obligations with France, or any other nation, and did not proceed from any motives unfriendly to France, as had been unwisely and wickedly misrepresented on both sides the water, and that it was the invariable and anxious determination of the Executive, to preserve the most friendly intercourse between the two Republics.

Let these various acts of misconduct be connected, and they lay a solid foundation for the measure which dismissed Mr. Monroe from public service, and create a murmur against the late President, for his long forbearance. I shall proceed to examine them with the light of the documents, for it is by them only, that the mind, inquisitive after truth, will be preserved from deception.

SCIPIO.

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No. III.

On the 2d August 1794, Mr. Monroe arrived at Paris, the successor of Mr. G. Morris, who had imprudently displeased the republic, and who for that reason, at the request of the committee of safety, had been recalled. He carried with him ample testimonies of the sincere good will of all the departments of the government of the United States to the French nation, and to the revolution in which it was engaged. On the 14th of August, he was admitted into the hall of the convention, when he presented his credentials and delivered the declara-



tions of the senate and house of representatives with which he was charged, and at the same time assured the convention that the President was actuated by similar sentiments. In giving an account of this transaction on the 25th of the same month, he writes thus—"The communication was received in a manner very interesting, and which furnished at the same time, the strongest proof of the affection entertained by the French nation for the United States of America.—The enclosed, No. 3, is a copy of my address to the convention, and of the president's answer. Every department has since shewn the *strongest disposition* to prove its attachment to their ally, by embracing every opportunity which the slightest incident has offered."\* This disposition so propitious to America, when his ministerial functions were commenced, cannot be attributed to him, as he seems to wish his readers to believe; for as yet he had only been received or acknowledged: nor is it consistent with what he states in his narrative, when he says that he found on his arrival, "that the work of alienation and disunion had been carried further than he had before suspected," and "that things were in a train for an entire separation of the two countries."† It is remarkable that Mr. Monroe did not intimate to the executive any dissatisfaction of the French councils with the American administration, until in his letter of the 12th February 1795, more than six months after his arrival, when he had occasion to apologize for some of his misdoings, which had been reprimanded by the executive on the 2d of December 1794. No such thing is to be found in his letters dated 15th September, 16 October, 7th November, 20th November, or 2d December, 1794. I cannot therefore but think that Mr. Mon-

\* page 17.

† page 7.



roe has not in his book, represented with candour, the dispositions of France during the first months of his mission, and that he is still more in the wrong when he arrogates to himself the merit of impressing the convention with sentiments of moderation and justice towards the United States. The favorable dispositions of the republic proceeded from the state of public affairs at that time. Robespierre and the faction of terrorists had been just cut off; the armies were every where victorious, and thus secure at home, and prosperous abroad, a spirit of moderation and equity prevailed in the convention for a little while, and was pervading France: Besides there was a real want of provisions. Under such circumstances, it was impossible not to obtain *promises* of satisfaction for all our just complaints, as well as a removal of the causes from whence they had arisen; and thus the alterations for the better, which took place at this period, were the natural result of public events, and not the consequence of our ministers' exertions, as he most vainly pretends.

The first act of misconduct which I have proposed to illustrate is, that he represented to the committee of public safety that he was not instructed *to complain* of the decree of May 1793, which dispensing with some of the articles of the treaty of amity and commerce, was attended with the most ruinous effects on the American commerce. This is immediately connected with the second—his information to the committee, *that he well knew*, that if upon experience it should be their opinion that it produced any solid good to the republic to disregard those articles of the treaty, the American government and his countrymen would not only bear with the departure *with patience but with plea-*

*sure.* These are so united in the documents, that they shall be considered together.

A decree of the French republic had been made in May 1793, authorising the seizure of enemy's property in neutral vessels, which was in force when Mr. Monroe arrived in Paris, and under which the Americans had suffered and were suffering much vexation and injury in their commerce. His predecessor it appears by several letters of the secretary of the state, had remonstrated against it, and was endeavouring to produce a repeal of it when he was superceded; and not only the existence of the decree, but the ruinous effects of it were notorious from one end of the continent to the other. Upon this subject the secretary of state wrote to Mr. Monroe on the 10th June, as follows: "But you will go farther and insist upon compensation for the captures and spoils of our property and injuries to the persons of our citizens by French cruizers."\* and on the 30th of July, as follows: "The cases of spoilation and vexation from the French cruizers on our trade, I again most earnestly recommend to your anxious attention. Mr. Fauchet has promised to forward a recommendation of them to his government. You will do well to press *the principle* without delay: and if doubts are entertained as to facts, put the subjects into a train for the most early decision. *The French republic will surely never suffer us to be plundered by their citizens*; and that we have greatly suffered by their plundering, the papers accompanying this letter, if they be true, manifest. We are not less disturbed at the conduct concerning the embargo at Bordeaux. If the account brought hither lately by one of the captains who were detained there be genuine, the promise of compensation has been illusory

only. You are therefore again charged to make this also your special and immediate business; and *to press the rights of our citizens in a manner which indicates that we cannot waive the justice due to us.* In short, sir; it is the express instruction of the president that you diligently enquire into every inconvenience to which our trade has been subjected, and remonstrate strongly upon them, and represent the facts to us fully and minutely. Had not Mr. Morris so strenuously pressed the affair of the ship Laurens of Charleston, which is committed to your care, I could repeat here all the circumstances. But these may be obtained as well from Mr. Morris, as from the French archives. *The decrees upon which the conduct of the French republic was founded in this case, which I note particularly on account of those decrees, have also been remonstrated against by Mr. Morris, and I question whether much matter can be added to his observations. But such of those decrees as tend to the condemnation of the Laurens, are gross violations of our rights.* You no doubt will have resumed this subject immediately on your arrival, and you are at liberty to speak in a firm and decisive tone, taking care to avoid offence, or in any degree to weaken the friendship between the two countries."\*

With these instructions, it is evident how the minister should have conducted himself. Let us next enquire what was his conduct; whether, as I have stated, he did represent to the committee, that he was not directed to complain of the decree contravening the treaty of amity and commerce, and whether he did inform the committee that his government and countrymen would bear with patience and with pleasure, a departure from the treaty, if such was the interest of France.

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## No. IV.

It appears that on the 3d of September, he presented to the committee of public safety his first state of paper, in which he requests payment of the claims of our citizens for supplies, compensation for the embargo at Bourdeaux, and for the injuries to our commerce in consequence of the departure, on the part of France, from the 23d and 24th articles of the treaty. This last he urges by many pertinent remarks, shewing it the interest of France to repeal the decree, but concludes with declaring he is not instructed to complain of or request the repeal of the decree authorizing a departure from those articles. His words are—"It is my duty to observe to you that I am under no instruction to complain of or request a repeal of the decree authorizing a departure from the 23d and 24th articles of the treaty of amity and commerce; on the contrary, *I well know, that if upon consideration, after the experiment made, you should be of opinion that it produces any solid benefit to the republic, the American government and my countrymen in general, will not only bear the departure with patience, but with pleasure\*.*"

On the 16th October he presented another note, in which he concisely mentions the same three subjects, and of the contravention of the treaty he merely says, "Nor shall I add any thing upon the third point to change the principle upon which I rested it."† This principle had been declared to be, that it was the interest of France to repeal the decree and to conform to the treaty; but if the committee thought otherwise, the United States would bear with pleasure whatever losses and

\* Page 34.

† Page 63.



vexations the citizens should suffer in their commerce under the operation of the decree.

Mr. Monroe, on the 7th November, before which time he had received Secretary Randolph's letter of the 30th July, wrote to the Secretary as follows; " I felt extremely embarrassed how to touch again their infringement of the treaty of commerce ; whether to call on them to execute it, or leave the question *on the ground on which I had at first placed it*. You desired me in your last to contest with them the principle ; *but yet this did not amount to an instruction, nor even convey your idea that it would be adviseable to demand of them the execution of those articles*. Upon full consideration, therefore, I concluded that it was the most safe and sound policy to leave this point where it was before, and in which I was the more confirmed by some circumstances that were afterwards disclosed.

The day after this last communication was presented, I received a letter from the committee, assuring me that the subject engrossed their entire attention, and that an answer should be given as soon as possible ; and a few days after this, I was favored with another, inviting me to a conference at 12 the next day. I attended and found only the three members of the diplomatic branch of the committee present, Merlin de Douay, Thuriot and Treilhard. Merlin commenced by observing that I had advised and pressed them to exercise the 23d and 24th articles of the treaty of amity and commerce : *that they were persuaded their compliance would be useful to us, but very detrimental to them ; it would likewise be distressing for Frenchmen to see British goods protected by our flag, whilst it gave no protection to theirs ; and after making other comments, he finally came to this point—" Do you insist upon our executing*

the treaty ?” I replied, *I had nothing new to add to what I had already said on that head.* Treilhard seemed surprised at the reply, and expressed a wish that I would declare myself frankly on the subject. I told him I was surprised at his remark, since I had not only declared myself frankly but liberally. We then passed from the point of demand to a more general discussion of the policy in France to execute the treaty, and in which I urged, that if she considered her own interest only, she ought not to hesitate, since it gave her the command of neutral bottoms, and under the protection of their own flag to supply her wants, with other considerations which had been before pressed in my notes that were before them. I was however brought back twice again to the question, “do you insist upon or demand it ?” I found that a positive and formal declaration on this point was the sole object of the interview ; and as I perceived that something was intended to be founded on it *either now or hereafter*, if given in the affirmative, I was the more resolved to avoid it and to adhere to the ground I had already taken. *I therefore repeated my declaration, and in the most explicit terms, that I was not instructed by the president to insist on it, nor did I insist on it.* That their compliance would certainly be highly beneficial to my country, but that in my observations I had considered the proposition *merely in relation to France*, and wished them to do the same, since I was satisfied that the true interest of France dictated the measure. They all expressed an attachment to us ; spoke much of the difficulty of their situation, and of the peculiar delicacy in adopting in the present state of the public mind, any measure which might be construed as eventually favoring England and thus the conference ended.

In revolving on the subject ever since, I have been doubtful whether the solicitude shewn to draw from me a decisive answer to the question, "whether I insisted or demanded of them to execute the articles of the treaty," was merely intended as the basis of their own act complying with it and a justification for themselves in so doing, or as a ground to call on us hereafter in the prosecution of the war against England to fulfil the guarantee. I was at the moment of the discussion in the committee of the latter opinion; but I must confess, upon a more general view of all circumstances that have passed under my observation since my arrival, that I am at present inclined to be of the former. I rather think as there is an opposition to the measure, and it would commence an important change in their system, and might also be construed into a partiality for England, (a nation by no means in favor here) that a dread of denunciation in the course of events suggested it. Be this as it may, I am perfectly satisfied *it would be impolitic to demand it, since the refusal would weaken the connection between the two countries, and the compliance upon that motive might perhaps not only produce the same effect, but likewise excite a disposition to press us on other points, upon which it were better to avoid any discussion.*"\*

This letter appears to me to contain too important information to be abridged, and therefore it has been so largely quoted. It not only proves that Mr. Monroe persisted in not demanding an execution of the 23d and 24th articles, but that he did worse: he agreed with the Committee of public safety that those articles might be disregarded on the part of France: Moreover, it furnishes conclusive proof that the system of commercial warfare at this day carried on by the French Republic,

\* Page 58.



originated from an opinion, that the people of the United States would bear with patience, and even with pleasure, whatever losses it should occasion, provided the good of France should be promoted: an opinion that the minister of the United States, of his mere motion suggested, and endeavoured to impress on the mind of France. I have heard it frequently said that the unjust and injurious measures of the French Republic towards our commerce, were recommended, were advised, were induced by certain characters who compose and lead the French faction in the United States—I had doubted this, but since I have read this letter, no doubt remains. In vain shall Mr. Monroe, or his coadjutors, endeavour to persuade the intelligent part of the community, that the injuries we daily feel from the hand of France, proceeds entirely from their dissatisfaction on account of the British treaty. I say it proceeds from the opinion which has been inculcated with industry, that the great body of the American people are so blindly attached to the French Republic, that they will not complain of any thing that France can do to them, and that their love to republicanism will never permit them to resent any measures that France may choose to take to promote its welfare. In short to a belief of the directory (as Mr. Monroe expresses it) that if upon consideration after experiment made, the French should be of opinion, that a departure of the treaty *would produce any solid benefit to the Republic, the American government and the people in general, would not only bear the departure with patience, but with pleasure.*

I cannot quit this subject, without a short review of Mr. Monroe's conduct, as presented by the documents that have been cited. It appears he had



originally, of his own accord, in his first written communication, informed the Committee of public safety, that he was not instructed to complain of their departure from the treaty, and if they found it their interest to continue to do so, his country would bear it with pleasure. The same idea he repeated in another solemn communication.— At a conference afterwards, with members charged with diplomatic concerns, he was informed “that they were persuaded their compliance would be useful to the United States, but very detrimental to them;” and was asked whether he insisted on their executing the treaty to which he replied, he had nothing new to add to what he had already said on that head. This was an explicit concession on his part, so far as he could concede, that the treaty in certain particulars need not be regarded: It was more; it was a compact or agreement between him and the Committee, that those articles might be disregarded. When he had condescended to inform the Committee, that if a departure from the treaty, on experiment, turned out to the advantage of the Republic, it would not be complained of, but borne with pleasure by the United States; and when the Committee informed him “they were persuaded their compliance would be detrimental to France,” to which he replied that he had nothing more to add, it seems to me that a contract, complete in all its parts was formally made; a contract, however not admitted to be binding on the United States, because there is no evidence that it was within the compass of the powers committed to Mr. Monroe; on the contrary, to have been not only unauthorized, but contrary to the part which he was instructed to act relative to this subject. I should not be surprised, however, if France should

take it as a basis for justifying the spoliations and injuries done to our commerce ; for it furnishes a better excuse than I supposed was to be found.

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No. V.

At most of this transaction I am not astonished, as it may have proceeded from violent prejudice in favour of France, from a disregard of the opinions of the Executive, and a desire to appear *all-important* in the eyes of his favourite nation ; but I am astonished to find, that while Mr. Monroe insists, and insists with great strength of reasoning, that a compliance with the treaty would be highly beneficial to France, and equally beneficial to the United States, that he did *not demand a compliance*. Both countries being interested in its execution, it was inexcusable not to have demanded it. But he attempts to excuse himself by saying he was afraid France would have in turn demanded a compliance with the guarantee stipulation. This was a vain fear : France knew well that the *casus fœderis* had not occurred, and in the state of the present war and of public affairs, that such a demand could not be made with justice or reason—Above all, Mr. Monroe should have borne in mind that his country is always animated with the purest sentiments of honour and good faith, and always ready to meet the claims of foreign nations, and by these principles to try them. He should have reflected that at the helm of American affairs was placed a man who well understood the in-

terests of his country, as well as the extent of the national engagements; and he should not have presumed to neglect or counteract the obvious intentions of the Executive. From whence did Mr. Monroe take up the notion that he was not to complain of the decree contravening the treaty? His predecessor remonstrated against it: The injuries arising from it had reached every part of the continent; it was neither the will of the President or of the people that they should be continued; wherefore then did he encourage France to continue the system of perfidy and depredation? Why did he debase his country at the feet of France, by telling the Republic to trample on our commerce, and we would smile under our indignities and losses? What offence had his country done him that he should take this severe revenge? Why should its minister prostrate it in the dust by a declaration no less abject than pernicious—by a policy which, while it exposed the United States to utter contempt, became the source of present and I fear of future ills.

These instances of misconduct being fully evident, let us next see what the President did when they became known to him. It is to be lamented he had not then displaced him. He only reprimanded him, as appears in his letter dated 2d December, in the following terms: "In your letter you say that you have not been instructed to desire a repeal of the decree which violated the 23d and 24th articles of the treaty of commerce: That you did not know but it had been tolerated from the soundest motives of political expedience, lest the demand for the rescinding it might produce a call for the guarantee. Indeed you have gone further; having declared in your memorial that you were under no instructions to complain of



or request the repeal of the decree authorising a departure from those articles, and "that if upon re-consideration after the experiment be made, the Committee of public safety should be of opinion that it produces any solid benefit to the French Republic, the American government, and your countrymen in general, would not only bear the departure with patience, but with pleasure."

"The fourth head of injury stated in your letter, shews that you were possessed of cases which turned entirely upon the impropriety of the decree, and such too was certainly the fact. Now, without the abrogation of the decree so far as it respected those cases, the redress which you were instructed to demand could not be obtained. In truth, there was no cause of pretence for asking relief but upon the ground of that decree having violated the treaty. Does not this view lead to the inevitable conclusion that the decree, if operative in future instances would be no less disagreeable, and consequently that its operation in future instances ought to be prevented, a circumstance which could be accomplished only by a total repeal? The papers of the ship *Laurens* contained a reference to one or more representations of Mr. Morris, against the decree; so that the business had been actually broken to the French government. Neither these representations, nor yet your application, appears to have suggested a requisition of the guarantee.

"But, my good Sir, let these things be as they will, was it necessary to intimate that an indifference prevailed in our government as to these articles, by a declaration that you were not instructed to complain of the decree? I confess I am unapprised of the data upon which such an opinion could be founded; and undoubtedly the Pre-

ident himself would not undertake that the people of the United States would bear with patience a departure from stipulations which are generally believed to be important to us.”\*

It is true it happened soon after this, in January 1795, that the French Republic saw cause to repeal the decree, and perhaps this occasioned the President to take no further notice of the misconduct of the minister relative to this subject. But surely, after reading the foregoing documents, few will pretend that Mr. Monroe's misrepresentations or concessions contributed to produce that effect. I know he has had the assurance to ascribe to himself the merit of this repeal, which without any doubt, was the consequence of the then state of affairs in France.—On the other hand, I ascribe to his doctrine of implicit submission to the will of a foreign power, which the French have been made to believe influences America with regard to them, their present system towards us, a system which having modified our treaty with France on this principle, is so baneful to our commerce, and so dishonourable to our national character. Indeed, it must be acknowledged that Mr Monroe expressed himself to the Committee “not only frankly but liberally” as he says, when he agreed that France might dispense with certain articles of the treaty, if it appeared to them advantageous so to do. To what length the Republic will carry this concession, is beyond my power to predict. It shall be left to the unfolding hand of time.

SCIPIO.

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\* page 116.

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No. VI.

I have fully shewn from the letters of the Executive, that Mr. Monroe was directed to complain of and remonstrate against the decree derogatory of the treaty of amity and commerce, and from his own communication that he represented to the French Republic that he was not instructed to complain of that decree.

I have also as fully shewn that Mr. Monroe, disregarding the sentiments of the President, and unmindful of the honour and interests of his country, declared frequently to the Committee of public safety, that the government and the people of the United States would bear with a departure from the treaty, not only with patience, but with pleasure, if on experience France should find it for her interest. I have cited the reprimand he received for these instances of misconduct, which in my humble judgment was far from adequate to the offence. What offence could be greater than unauthorisedly to dispense with a treaty, and to surrender the commerce of his country to the discretion of a foreign power? What offence could be greater than to communicate and to establish an opinion in the French Republic, that whatever it might think proper to do to our commerce, would be borne with pleasure, if it conduced to the advantage of France?

I have shewn too that this opinion of the French, of our preference of their interests to our own, which our minister inculcated, and which so many gazettes and so many occurrences have contributed to confirm, is the true source of the insults and

injuries which our citizens are now, and for a long time have been suffering. If these things have been demonstrated, and I think the documents undeniably evince them, what irreparable injuries have not Mr. Monroe and the French faction done to America? Let me dismiss this painful subject by calling the attention of the reader to an assertion of the ex-minister, particularly remarkable for its want of candour. He says that a few days after the letter of reprimand, another letter, on the 5th of December was written to him, which seemed to contain an apology for the harsh language of the former. This letter of the 5th December, does not relate to any matter complained of in that of the 2d. It acknowledges the receipt of his letters of the 10th and 25th August, and observes on the contents of these letters, neither of which furnished any cause of complaint. For further satisfaction, let the reader peruse the letter itself.\*

The 3d instance of misconduct which I proposed for consideration was, that Mr. Monroe represented in positive terms to the Committee of public safety, that Mr. Jay's mission was limited to two objects only : a compensation for spoliations, and a surrender of the posts, which representation is not warranted by his instructions. The secretary of State urges this language. " We mean to continue the same line of conduct in future ; and to remove all jealousy with respect to Mr. Jay's mission to London, you may say, that he is positively forbidden to weaken the engagements between this country and France. It is not improbable that you will be obliged to encounter on this head suspicions of various kinds ; but you may declare the *motives of that mission to be to obtain immediate compensation for our*

\* page 125.



*plundered property, and restitution of the posts*”\* No one can be at a loss to understand these expressions; nor can it be doubted that the motives of the mission to London, were such as are here declared. If the posts had been in our possession, and if no spoliations on our commerce had been committed, our complaints against Great Britain on other accounts would have remained to be negotiated by the very able minister resident at London. But the spoliations, and the detention of the posts, were evils too heavy any longer to be borne, and before an appeal was made to the God of battles, a solemn and last appeal was made to the justice and good faith of the British nation. While these principal matters should be under adjustment, it was reasonable to expect all those of a secondary consequence would also be considered, and that one treaty would comprehend all the subjects which were in difference between the two nations. As it was only by *a treaty*, that the differences could be compromised, and as one of our greatest complaints against Great-Britain had constantly been that she refused to make a commercial treaty with us, and as future injuries to our commerce would be most surely prevented by a treaty of commerce, it followed of course that a commercial treaty on good terms would be very acceptable to us, if it could be obtained from that nation. How strange then must it appear, that Mr. Monroe did not rightly represent Mr. Jay’s mission, and that he should never have used the words or the substance of the words of the Secretary of State, though he purposely met the Committee to address them on this subject. What passed between him and the Committee deserves particular notice.

\* page 2.

In his letter dated the 21 of December 1794, to Secretary Randolph, he mentions that he had sought and obtained an interview with the diplomatic members of the Committee for the purpose of removing unfavourable suspicions which were entertained concerning the mission to London. What passed at this meeting relative to this object, is stated by him in the following words: "By another I was asked whether Mr Jay was still in London, and whether he intended to come over to Paris, as had been published in an English paper. This was the suspicion I wished to combat and remove, though indeed I did not expect it would have been avowed in so abrupt a manner; I replied I could not tell *whether he had returned or not*; but that it was impossible the paragraph in the English paper should be true, as he was sent to England upon an especial business only to demand reparation for injuries, and to which his authority was strictly limited."\* In his pamphlet he informs the public, that he replied "the report could not be true, since Mr. Jay was sent to England upon special business only, to demand compensation for the depredation, on our trade, *and the surrender of the western posts*, to which his authority was strictly limited." The variance between the two statements may not be deemed material; but if it be, and if the latter was the purport of Mr. Monroe's representation, as Mr. Purviance certifies, it follows that our minister has been guilty of two misrepresentations: 1st, a misrepresentation to the Committee of the powers of Mr. Jay being strictly limited to spoliations and the posts; and 2dly, a misrepresentation to the Executive of the misrepresentation he made to the Committee.

\* page 90.

It is true, that Mr. Monroe admits in his narrative, that the nature and object of Mr. Jay's mission to England had been misrepresented through him to the French government.\* I ask whose fault was this? Had he averted to the words of Secretary Randolph, and conformed to them or to their meaning, he would not have been guilty of misrepresenting to the Committee, that Mr. Jay's powers were limited solely and exclusively to spoliations on our commerce and the detention of our posts. All that Secretary Randolph said to minister Monroe was, that Mr. Jay was restrained from contravening any former treaties with other nations, and the motives of the mission were to obtain compensation for spoliations and a surrender of the posts. If the minister had thus represented the mission, he would have been correct; but he institutes another language, and very different ideas. He says "Mr. Jay was sent to England upon an especial business *only*, to demand reparation for injuries, *and to which his authority was strictly limited.*" Having thus misrepresented this matter to the Committee, he most audaciously undertakes to cast the blame of it on the Executive of the United States; as if the Executive could supply him with intelligence of mind or rectitude of principle, in case either were wanting. The words of Secretary Randolph were plain.

It might be expected that Mr. Monroe would have gone to the conference which the Committee granted to him, well prepared upon the topic which he intended to introduce, and that his instructions on that were thoroughly understood. Yet the reverse appears to have been the case, and it was on this occasion when he met them at his own request that the misrepresentation was



made. It may be asked, what should he have said? I answer, he should have used the words of Secretary Randolph; he might have added, that his country, the United States of America, having received many injuries from Great-Britain, had sent an envoy to demand satisfaction and to prevent complaints, by placing the intercourse between the two nations upon the stable principles of justice and benevolence, and that it was the earnest desire of America to live in peace and harmony with all the nations of the earth. Most especially, he should not have so mistated the mission, as to lay a certain foundation for the future disappointment and discontents of the French Republic, in case it succeeded.

SCIPIO.

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No. VII.

I proceed now to the examination of the fourth instance of misconduct in Mr. Monroe, which has been specified. *He promised to the Committee of public safety, unnecessarily and improperly to communicate to them the stipulations of the treaty negotiated with Great-Britain, so soon as they should be known to him; and before the treaty could possibly have been sent to the United States, he sent a special messenger to London to obtain a copy for the particular purpose of laying it before the Committee, and pertinaciously refused to know from Mr. Jay the contents of the treaty, unless permitted to communicate them to the Committee.*

Before any remarks are made, it will be necessary to recite the several letters which passed upon this subject. On the 27th of December 1794,

the Committee wrote to Mr. Monroe as follows :  
 “ We are informed citizen, that there was lately concluded at London, a treaty of *alliance* and commerce between the British Government and Citizen Jay, Envoy Extraordinary of the United States.

“ A vague report spreads itself, that in this treaty the Citizen Jay has forgotten those things which our treaties with the American people, and the sacrifices which the French people made to render them free, gave us a right to expect on the part of a minister of a nation, which we have so many motives to consider as friendly. It is important that we know positively in what light we are to hold this affair. There ought not to subsist between two free people the dissimulation which belongs to courts, and it gives us pleasure to declare, that we consider you as much opposed *personally* to that kind of policy as we ourselves. *We invite you then to communicate to us as soon as possible the treaty whereof, there is question. It is the only means whereby you can enable the French Nation, justly to appreciate those reports, so injurious to the American Government, and to which that treaty gave birth.*”\*

To this letter our minister answered the same day, in the following words—“ I was favoured this morning with yours of yesterday, intimating that the report of a treaty, said to be concluded by Mr. Jay, Envoy Extraordinary of the United States to England with that nation, derogatory to the treaties of alliance and commerce subsisting between those states and this Republic, had given you some disquietude, and requesting information from me upon that point. I obey the invitation with pleasure, because I well know that a candid policy is that alone which becomes Republics, and

because it is likewise most correspondent with the wishes of the American government and my own feelings.

“ Having already communicated to you the *limited object* of Mr. Jay’s mission, it only remains for me to inform you what I know of the result. All that I know upon this subject, is comprised in a letter received yesterday from Mr. Jay, of November 25th, in which he says that he had fulfilled the principal object of his mission by concluding a treaty, signed on the 19th of the same month, which contains a declaration “that it should not be construed nor operate contrary to our existing treaties, and that therefore our engagements are not affected by it.” He adds, that as the treaty is not yet ratified, it would be improper to *publish it*. I am altogether ignorant of the *particular stipulations of the treaty*, but beg leave to assure, that as soon as I shall be informed thereof, I will communicate the same to you. I take it however for granted, that the report is without foundation; for I cannot believe that an American minister would ever forget the connections between the United States and France, which every day’s experience demonstrates to be the interest of both Republics still further to cement.” The letter of Mr. Jay to which Mr. Monroe refers, is as follows :—

London, November 25th, 1794.

SIR,

“ By a letter written and sent a few days ago, I had the pleasure of informing you, that on the 19th instant the *principal business of my mission* was concluded by a treaty signed on that day. It contains a declaration that it shall not be construed nor



operate contrary to our existing treaties ; as therefore, our engagements with other nations remain unaffected by it, there is reason to hope that *our preserving peace and good understanding with this country, will not give uneasiness to any other.* As the treaty is not yet ratified, it would be improper to publish it. It appears to me upon the whole fair, and as equal as could be expected. In some respects both nations will probably be pleased, and in others displeased."

The letter to which Mr. Jay refers, is dated 24th November, and as follows: "Sir, It gives me pleasure to inform you, that a treaty between the United States and his Britannic Majesty was signed on the 19th instant. This circumstance ought not to give any uneasiness to the convention. The treaty expressly declares, that nothing contained in it shall be construed or operate contrary to existing treaties between the United States and other powers. I flatter myself, that the United States, as well as all their ministers, will upon every occasion, manifest the most scrupulous regard to good faith, and *that those nations who wish us well, will be pleased with our preserving peace and a good understanding with others.*"

A few days after this, Mr. Jay, on the 28th November, wrote to Mr. Monroe—"As Mr. Pinckney has a cypher with our ministers in Europe, either he or I will shortly use it in communicating to you the principal heads of the treaty *confidentially.* You need not hesitate in the mean time, to say explicitly, that it contains nothing repugnant to our engagements with any other nation." To this letter Mr. Monroe, on the 17th January 1795, returned this answer.—"Sir, early in December last, English papers were received here, containing such accounts

of your adjustment with the British administration, has excited much uneasiness in the councils of this government, and I had in contemplation to dispatch a confidential person to you, for such information of what had been done, as would enable me to remove it. At that moment, however, I was favoured with yours of the 25th November, *intimating* that the contents of the treaty could not be made known until it was ratified; but that I might say it contained nothing derogatory to our existing treaties with other powers. Thus advised, I thought it improper to make the application, because I concluded the arrangement was mutual, and not to be departed from. I proceeded therefore to make the best in my power of the information already given. To-day, however, I was favoured with yours of the 28th of the same month, by which I find you consider yourself at liberty to communicate to me the contents of the treaty; and as it is of great importance to our affairs here, to remove all doubt upon this point, I have thought it proper to resume my original plan of sending to you for the necessary information, and have in consequence, dispatched the bearer, Mr. John Purviance, for that purpose. I have been the more induced to this from the further consideration, that in case I should be favoured with the communication promised in cypher, it would be impossible for me to comprehend it, as Mr. Morris took his with him. Mr. Purviance is from Maryland, a gentleman of integrity and merit, and to whom you may commit whatever you may think proper to confide, with perfect safety. It is necessary however, to *observe that as nothing will satisfy this government but a copy of the instrument itself, and which as our ally, it thinks itself intitled to; so it will be useless for me to make*

*to it any new communication short of that. I mention this, that you may know precisely the state of my engagements here, and how I deem it my duty to act under them in relation to this object.* I beg leave to refer you to Mr. Purviance for whatever information you may wish on this subject, or the affairs more generally of the Republic.”\* To this letter, Mr. Jay answered on the 5th February—“Sir, I have received the letter you did me the honour to write on the 17th of last month, by Mr. Purviance.”

It is much to be regretted, that any unauthorized accounts in English Newspapers of my “adjustment with the British administration, should have excited much uneasiness in the councils of the French Government; and the more so, as it does not imply that confidence in the honour and good faith of the United States which they certainly merit. You must be sensible that the United States, as a free and independent nation, have an unquestionable right to make any pacific arrangements with other powers which mutual convenience may dictate; provided those arrangements do not contradict or oppugn their prior engagements with other states.

Whether this adjustment was consistent with our treaty with France, struck me as being the only question which could demand or receive the consideration of that Republic; and I thought it due to the friendship subsisting between the two countries, that the French Government should have, without delay, the most perfect satisfaction on that head. I therefore, by three letters, viz. the 24th, 25th, and 28th, of November 1794, gave you what I hoped would be very acceptable and satisfactory information on that point: I am happy in this



opportunity of giving you an exact and literal extract from the treaty ; it is in these words, viz.

“ Nothing in this treaty contained shall however be construed or operate contrary to former or existing public treaties with other sovereigns or states.”

Considering that events favourable to our country could not fail to give you pleasure, I did intend to communicate to you concisely some of the most interesting particulars of this treaty, but in *the most perfect confidence*: As that instrument has not yet been ratified, nor received the ultimate forms to give it validity ; as further questions respecting parts of it may yet arise and give occasion to further discussions and negotiations, so that if finally concluded at all, it may then be different from what it now is, the impropriety of making it public at present is palpable and obvious. Such a proceeding would be inconvenient and unprecedented : It does not belong to ministers who negotiate treaties to publish them even when perfected, much less treaties not yet completed, and remaining open to alteration or rejection ; such acts also belong exclusively to the governments who form them.

I cannot but flatter myself that the present government is too enlightened and reasonable to expect that any consideration ought to induce me to overlook the bounds of my authority, or to be negligent of the respect which is due to the United States. *That respect, and my obligations to observe it, will not permit me to give, without the permission of their Government, a copy of the instrument in question to any person, or for any purpose ; and by no means for the purpose of being submitted to the consideration and judgment of the councils of a foreign nation, however friendly. I will, Sir, take the earliest opportunity of transmitting a copy of your letter to me, and of this answer*

*to it, to the Secretary of State, and will immediately and punctually execute such orders and instructions as I may receive on the subject."*

To this most excellent letter of Mr. Jay, our minister at Paris could not, and therefore did not, return any answer; and so the correspondence was concluded between them, except that afterwards Mr. Trumbull went to Paris, by whom Mr. Jay wrote again to Mr. Monroe, referring him, relative to the treaty, to verbal information, to be received from Mr. Trumbull, *in perfect confidence*; which also Mr. Monroe declined to accept, upon these terms.

SCIPIO.

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No. VIII.

Upon reading the preceding letters, every one must be struck with the contrast which they present. If the indiscretion, if the abject condescension, if the zeal of Mr. Monroe to serve the French republic on this occasion, excite painful sensations in the breast of every true American, the prudence, the independence of spirit, and the genuine patriotism which distinguish Mr. Jay, ought to be a source of heartfelt pleasure.

Our minister at Paris having misrepresented the mission to London, it was improbable, if not impossible, that any treaty negotiated at Great-Britain, would not have been the subject of complaints on the part of France. So hostile was France to Great-Britain that it would have objected to any treaty whatever, and therefore those who wished to defeat any and every treaty, would endeavour to do so anterior to

its ratification. With this view, the committee of public safety were anxious to possess a copy of the treaty which was reported to have been negotiated, and they requested Mr. Monroe to furnish them with the treaty itself as soon as possible, *declaring that it was the only means that would satisfy them concerning it.* What right had the committee to make this request? and why was it made in terms so full of insolence? The forms of our constitution are well known in France, and consequently, they knew that the treaty had not been ratified when they desired a copy. It was only for the purpose of enabling them to interfere with effect in our national contracts, that the demand was made. But they are not ashamed to accompany this unwarrantable request, with a declaration that a sight of *the treaty alone would satisfy them*; in plainer words, that they would not believe any thing that Mr. Monroe our minister should tell them on the subject. That Mr. Monroe should be insensible to any insults offered to his country by France; or that he should yield to its demands however improper, they who know his blind and fanatical attachments will suppose possible: But had he no feeling for his own honour, for his own reputation, when he was told by the Committee, and in writing too, that nothing but the treaty itself would satisfy them, or in other words, they should not believe any thing he should say concerning it? To this demand, encroaching on our rights of sovereignty, and expressed in terms the most contemptuous, was no other answer to be given, than that he (Mr. Monroe) was then ignorant of the particular stipulations of the treaty, but *he begged leave to assure them*, he would communicate the same to them as soon as he should be informed? He ought to have told the Committee with manly candour, that the treaty could not be communicated



in its present unfinished state to the councils of any foreign nation; and he might have repeated what by order of his government he had before told them, that no stipulation would be made inconsistent with the prior engagements of the United States to foreign nations; and he might have informed them on the authority of our envoy, that no such stipulations had been made.

The ex-minister was not satisfied with giving this evidence of his tame, mean-spirited deportment towards the committee: He went further, and made an effort to comply with their insolent and ill-intentioned request, by sending a special messenger to London for the treaty, even although he was informed by Mr. Jay, that it was improper to publish the treaty without the express leave of government before it was ratified, and was offered a copy of the treaty in perfect confidence only. In his letter he tells Mr. Jay, that he had promised to communicate the treaty to the committee, who *as allies thought they were entitled to it*, and said nothing less would satisfy them; for which purpose he had sent for it; and when this wise and steady statesman absolutely refused him a copy, for the very reason that induced the ex-minister to send for it, the refusal is taken sorely at heart, and is the subject of various and inconsistent complaints to the Secretary of State. In his letter dated 17th March 1795 he laments that he was not possessed of information that might be useful to our affairs in France and says, if the communication had been made to him, he should have declared that on his own knowledge the treaty did not interfere with the prior engagements, but that being a mere project, subject to rejection &c. it ought not to be published; and that this declara-

tion would have been satisfactory to the committee.\* To Mr. Jay, however, when he applied for the treaty, he said that nothing less than the treaty itself would satisfy the committee; that he had promised it to them, and had sent for it for their use; and he even added, that as allies they thought they had a right to it.—Under these inconsistencies, it is no wonder we find Mr. Monroe under constant embarrassments. When Mr. Jay offered the treaty to him in confidence, he refused to take it, saying it would not answer his ends, unless he could shew it to the Committee; and that his promise to them required him to communicate it whenever it should be in his power. It was then his own fault that he did not obtain, as he might have obtained, the treaty confidentially. If he had not been so kind and liberal in his promises, he would have got it, and on his own knowledge of it, he might have represented it truly to the Committee. It is true, when our Envoy was desired to communicate it, to enable Mr. Monroe to perform this promise, he with great propriety absolutely refused to do so. If he had complied, after he knew the design of the request, he would have been equally culpable with Mr. Monroe.

But the ex-minister affects to be perplexed relative to Mr. Jay's conduct, who after informing him that the treaty could *not be published*, offered to communicate the contents to him *in confidence*. This was perfectly consistent and proper in our Envoy, who no doubt supposed it might be useful to our public affairs, that our minister at the French Republic should confidentially know the situation of this country in relation to so powerful a nation as Great-Britain; and who also believed it was neither prudent nor necessary that our minister at

Paris should communicate to the French Republic, whatever he knew concerning the United States. Another thing seems to the ex-minister very unaccountable, that Mr. Jay should offer to him the treaty and then deny it. Let it be remembered, he offered it in confidence, and denied it after Mr. Monroe had stated that his engagements to the Committee required him to lay the treaty before them whenever he got it; so that it was impossible to communicate it confidentially.

As allies, it is said by the committee, they had a right to inspect the treaty we were making with Great Britain. Did France ever exhibit to the President of the United States any of her treaties, either before or after they were concluded? This idea so humiliating, does not appear to have been disapproved, but even countenanced by our minister to the French Republic, in his letter to Mr. Jay, where he seems to urge it as a reason for letting him have the treaty for the committee.

Disappointed in getting a copy of the treaty from our envoy, he still continued his exertions. When Major Pinckney was at Paris on his way to Madrid, our minister Monroe represented to him that France was inclined to give him every aid, if he would desire it, and would also satisfy the committee that they were not injured by the treaty negotiated with Great Britain.

It was well known to Mr. Monroe, that nothing but a copy of the treaty (which he also knew was in possession of Major Pinckney) would be satisfactory to the committee; and therefore one of the conditions mentioned to Major Pinckney, on which the aid of France was to be expected, was the disclosure of the British treaty to the committee. It is thus Mr. Pinckney understood the proposition, and



with great propriety he too refused to shew the treaty to the Committee, or to ask the aid of France in his negociation. Let me cite from Mr. Monroe's letter to the Secretary of State, of 14th June 1795, what he lays on this subject: "Whilst here I presented to his (Major Pinckney) view what had passed between this Government and myself upon the subject of his mission, assuring him from what I had heard and seen, that *I was of opinion, in case he would explain himself to the Committee upon that subject and express a wish, they would give what aid they could conveniently, in support of his negociation; satisfying them at the same time, that they were not injured by Mr. Jay's treaty, they would do it, &c. &c.* Mr Pinckney was sensible of the benefit which the aid of this Republic would yield in his negociation, and wished it; but upon mature consideration he could not request such aid, without having previously exposed to its view Mr. Jay's treaty, and which he did not chuse to do, for considerations delicacy forbade me to enquire into."\*

After these unavailing endeavours to obtain a copy of the treaty for the Committee of public safety, Mr. Monroe was obliged to acquiesce, and to wait with patience till the President and Senate should act upon it, unadvised by foreign councils. In endeavouring to defeat the final success of the mission to London, every motive seemed to have concurred in influencing his conduct in this transaction—his personal dislike to Mr. Jay, his devotion to France, his hatred of England, and above all, his love to himself. In this view, he has informed the public, that he very early foresaw if the treaty should be ratified, and not agreeable to

France, that he should probably be recalled. If Mr. Monroe did foresee this, (and his penetration on this point I am not inclined to call in question) it is very evident that his self-love, or rather his anxious desire to remain at Paris, would prompt him to do any thing that would prevent *any treaty* with Great-Britain from being fully confirmed—I say *any treaty*, because it was well known to him that any treaty with that nation would be disagreeable to the French Republic, and on this event he expected his continuance in office would depend. This foresight which Mr. Monroe thought he possessed, and which has explained his solicitude to get a copy of the treaty, will be a key to the sequel of his diplomatic conduct. It was not altogether to serve France, that the Representative of the United States descended to be the humble instrument of the Committee, but to promote his own views—a thing not uncommon among the men who appear most devoted to the will of foreign nations.

SCIPIO.

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No. IX.

A fifth act of misconduct in our late minister will attract attention, upon reading his pamphlet. *He encouraged the French republic in a project to obtain by loan, from the United States, a sum of money to enable it to prosecute the war ; a measure which he was not authorised to take, and which would have inevitably drawn them from a state of neutrality, and would have rendered them the unhappy and humble dependents on the fortune and will of France.*

The Secretary of State, Mr. Randolph, in his letter of the 10th June, 1794,\* after observing that the mission to London, if it should fail, would tend to unite the people of the United States, uses this concise and unequivocal language: "This may be briefly touched upon as the path of prudence with respect to ourselves, and also with respect to France, since *we are unable to give her aids of men or money.*"

These expressions must be admitted to be plain enough to be understood by every body. "*We are unable to give her aids of men or money,*" can have but one meaning. If this sentiment of the executive had been spread over pages, it is possible, out of a multitude of words, some colour or subterfuge might have been found for palliating the part which Mr. Monroe acted when he encouraged, and even explained to the committee the outlines of a plan for obtaining a large sum of money on loan from the United States to enable France to prosecute the war in Europe, which he thought they were able and willing to lend. On this occasion we shall find him transgressing the limits of his instructions, and pursuing the object most dear to his heart, and never out of his view; *the object of tacking the United States to the French republic.* I am aware, that the more closely Mr. Monroe shall have stuck to this principle, the more effectually he must have recommended himself to the democrats, or Jacobins, of America; yet, as I love justice, and wish not to derogate from his merits with this description of his fellow-citizens, I shall not pass without notice, this evidence of the slavish spirit which generally marks his unprofitable or pernicious ministry.

Relative to this subject, Mr. Monroe, on the 30th November, 1794, wrote to the secretary of



state a letter, of which the following are extracts: "In the close of this affair, I was invited by the diplomatic members of the committee of public safety, to a conference upon a new topic. I was informed it was their intention to press the war against England in particular, but that they were distressed for funds, and was asked, could any aid be obtained from the United States. *I told him I was satisfied, if it was in their power, it would be rendered*; that I possessed no power on the subject, and could only advise on the probability, &c. but with their permission I would put on paper such ideas as occurred to me in respect to that point, and upon which I would afterwards more fully confer, &c.\*

"No other arrangement can well be made than that of lending money to France, if in our power; it being understood she will secure, *at the time of her own peace*, the complete recognition of our rights from Britain and Spain, and which she may easily do, in my judgment, and without prolonging the war a moment on that account, &c."†

After extolling the power and successes of France, he adds, "In any event it will produce such effect, that if America strikes the blow her own interest dictates, and every other consideration prompts, it must be decisive; and if not ruinous to the fortunes of that proud and insolent nation, will certainly procure us the objects we have in view."

I will here put a few questions: When Mr. Monroe was told, in his instructions, "that the United States were unable to aid France with money," by what authority did he desire permission to put his ideas on paper relative to a loan of money, and again to confer on that point? Why did he so forci-

\* page 72.

† page 73.

bly encourage the President to come into the measure of the loan? Why does the representative of a nation *neutral and desirous to continue neutral*, incite America to strike a blow that might be ruinous to the fortunes of a great nation, with whom we were actually at peace, and at that moment actually negotiating, as he must have believed, a treaty of amity? What was the blow which Mr. Monroe advised?

If these matters require explanation, they will be found explained by his note to the Committee of public safety, of which the following are extracts. \*

"It is the wish of the French republic to obtain by loan a sum of money from the United States of America, to enable it to prosecute the war. This is to be expected from three sources; the general government, the state government, and from individuals. The French cause and the French nation are greatly regarded in America, and *I am persuaded some money may be obtained, and perhaps a very respectable sum*, from the three sources above mentioned. For this purpose, the minister should possess power to make loans from either of the above parties, and to give such security as the republic shall deem suitable, &c." Some account is given of our claims upon Great-Britain and Spain, and the note proceeds—"If the United States were assured that they would have no occasion for their own resources to support a war against those powers, it would of course be more in their power to lend them to the French Republic" &c. "The sum which might be raised in America from the different sources above mentioned, upon an assurance of this kind, would in my judgment be considerable. In any event, however, *I shall be happy to give the minister*

*about to depart, every information and aid in my power, in forwarding the object in view."*

Though Mr. Monroe had been told in his instructions that the United States could not aid France with money, here is a project for obtaining a sum of money on loan, which he communicated in writing to the Committee, and which he thought would be obtained, if we could be assured by France that we should not need our resources for vindicating our rights against Britain and Spain. The sum contemplated was four or five millions of dollars, and the plan of Mr. Monroe was that this sum should be advanced on loan if France would promise to secure to us when it should make peace, the navigation of the Mississippi, the Western Posts, and would protect us against the Algerines. In his letter of the 2d December 1794, to the Secretary of State, he writes concerning the loan in this manner. "I sincerely wish we may assist them if possible, and which I presume it will be, especially if not comprised in the war and which I think cannot be although we should immediately wrest from Britain and Spain the rights they have usurped from us, &c. &c. I am persuaded the amount expected might be obtained by loan, *and I am equally so that the people* would cheerfully bear a tax, the product of which was to be applied in aid of the French Republic. Upon these topics I have only a right to conjecture," &c.\*

I will say no more upon this palpable disregard of his instructions, and this direct counteraction of the pacific and neutral policy of the executive. The project, if it had been carried into effect, would have delivered our country bound hand and foot, into the arms of the French Republic. We were to lend our money and were to trust to France for



protection and for obtaining justice for us from Britain and Spain at some future day, namely, when it should make peace with those nations. Thus if peace should be deferred ever so long, America was to continue without compensation for spoliation on our commerce, without the Western Posts, and without the navigation of the Mississippi, and in the mean time was to put its resources into the hands of France, and to confide its most essential interests, I might say its very being, to the power and will of the French Republic.

To recommend the project Mr. Monroe stated, that we might lend the money to France to prosecute the war; and remain at peace with all the belligerent nations. Is it possible that he could really entertain such an opinion; or was he insidiously intending to draw us into the war on the side of France. Surely Britain would not have beheld us affording to France a loan of money to carry on the war without resenting a departure from neutrality so insufferable; and if Britain should have resented it there must have been a rupture. Besides how wrest the Posts from Great Britain without war? Being once involved on the side of that insatiable Republic, the blood and treasures of our country would have been lavished, and never would it think that we did enough till Britain should be added to her conquered countries—from this most dangerous snare most fortunately we were snatched by the British treaty: After that was concluded, our minister and the committee desisted from pressing the project, until it should be known whether the treaty was rejected or not; for which measure Mr. Monroe's letters, stating the friendly disposition of France, held out the strongest inducements.

In his justificatory letter of the 12th February 1795, writing on this point he says, "For at that

time I had reason to believe that it (France) *contemplated to take under its care* and to provide for our protection against Algiers, for the expulsion of the British from the Western Posts, and the establishment of our rights with Spain to the free navigation of the Mississippi, to be executed in a mode we should prefer, and upon terms perfectly easy to us; terms in short, which sought only the aid of our credit to obtain a loan from our own banks for an inconsiderable sum \* to be laid out in the purchase of provisions within our own country, *to be reimbursed if possibly by themselves,*" &c. Generous nation! kind and good souls! so boundless is your benevolence you would take under your care all the nations of the world. You would administer justice and mercy among them all, without any earthly reward but the sublime pleasure of doing good. With you virtue is the rule of every action. With you those terrible passions, avarice and ambition, the scourges of the human race are only known in name.

These, or such as these, may have been the imaginations of our infatuated minister, when he contemplated the United States under the protection and care of the French Republic. At that period the example of Batavia had not been presented to the world. It is here we may now behold in reality the miserable, wretched and hopeless condition of a people under the domination of France. Drained of millions to support the French armies, frugality and industry banished, commerce destroyed, all the useful employments of a peace establishment, neglected or forbidden, we may there see a republic without a will, and its citizens without a power over their persons or property.

\* Five millions of dollars is the sum mentioned in another place, by Mr. Monroe.

There we may see the most deplorable slavery, political and civil. Let this dreadful example be a warning. Let America hold fast its resources and remember always, they can be trusted no where but in the hands of Americans.

SCIPIO.

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No. X.

Relative to the sum of money which it was proposed that the United States should lend to France to enable it to prosecute the war, it should be remembered the project was encouraged by Mr. Monroe at a time when under no possible circumstances it could have been proper. The negotiation with Great-Britain was then pending. If it succeeded, peace with that nation would have been continued and the loan would have been a violation of neutrality not to be justified. If it failed, war with Great-Britain must have been the consequence, and all our money and resources would have been necessary *in our own hands*. Why then did our Minister, though otherwise instructed by the President, give a plan for obtaining the loan, promise his aid to the French minister, and write to the Secretary of State that the people would, in his opinion, *cheerfully* bear a tax that should raise money for the French. He ought to have recollected how those who concurred with him in politics ever have been and are opposed to all plans of raising revenues to be applied to the support of the general Government: how a certain class, called Antifederalists, Democrats, or Jacobins, com-



posing the French faction, have laboured incessantly to render the administration of the government odious to the people, and with how much difficulty revenue laws have been passed for raising the monies necessary to discharge our revolution-debts, and to uphold the present system of the Union. Recollecting these things, it is almost, but not quite, unaccountable that he should have thought the people of the United States would have "*paid a tax cheerfully to raise a sum for the French Treasury, relying on a mere promise of France to reimburse the loan, if possible, at some future day.*" Did he really believe the people would pay taxes for France more cheerfully than for themselves, or was it the phrenzy of a distempered mind? He could not, in sober sense have believed it. His countrymen were never nor are they yet disposed to be tributary to the French Republic or to any foreign nation in the Universe. It is true their patience under the many injuries and indignities which have been accumulated on them, has been wonderful. If it has been misinterpreted for pusillanimity, or for excessive fondness for the French Republic, the delusion cannot much longer remain: and when it shall be removed, and the rulers in France shall learn by experience the real temper of the country, and feel its courage, they will view with contempt the men who, having deceived and disappointed them, at length produced a lasting separation between the two nations; the men who, frustrated in the *scheme of tacking the United States as a province to the French Republic*, for their selfish purposes of ambition or avarice, shall, if thought of at all in America, be thought of with abhorrence.

The documents published by Mr. Monroe, as well as his own narration of his ministry, furnish

another instance in which his conduct appears highly censurable. *He neglected for a long time to state and urge with sincerity and prudence to the Directory of France, the arguments of the Executive with which he had been furnished, proving that the treaty with Great-Britain was not inconsistent with our neutrality to France, and did not proceed from any motives unfriendly to France, as had been wickedly misrepresented on both sides the Atlantic.*

There is a sort of people who are indebted for the notice which the public has bestowed on them, principally to the malignant hatred which they have uniformly declared against Great-Britain. A person of this description cannot be expected to be reconciled to our treaty with that nation, because that instrument not only prevented a war with that nation, but is likely long to prevent one. Mr. Monroe, I am sure, will glory in the reputation of *hating Britain, and loving France*, which he has taken so much pains to acquire. I mention this as it will serve to explain the line of conduct, which the Documents prove he observed upon the subject of the British treaty, and when it is remembered that he hated Britain even with *Gallic* hatred, it must have been natural to him to entertain a cordial wish that the treaty should excite the resentments of France, and by some means or other be defeated or annulled. Besides, he has informed the community that he foresaw in the spring, 1795, if the treaty was ratified he would probably be recalled, so that the treaty must have been peculiarly odious to him for this expected consequence.\*

For substantiating this charge of misconduct, it is necessary to refer to the documents. Mr. Monroe, in his letter to the Secretary of State, dated 17th August, 1795, which is the first he wrote after the

treaty was known at Paris, informed the Secretary, "that within a few days past, Philadelphia papers were received as late as the 3d of July, containing Mr. Jay's treaty, together with such proceedings of the Senate upon it as were then published, &c. *Of late I have heard nothing from the Committee on this subject, nor do I expect to hear any thing from that body upon it, let the impression be what it may, otherwise than in reply to such communication as I may make thereon, and respecting which, it may be proper to add, that I shall take no step without your particular instruction.*"

In the same letter he says, "As I have had no communication with this government upon the subject of this treaty since its contents were known, it is of course impossible for me to say what the impression it has made is. It is easy for you *with the lights you have*, to form a correct opinion upon that point in Philadelphia". He afterwards mentioned that he heard an objection was made by many to that part of the 18th article which related to provisions; and this is the only objection it appears had then been brought forward.\*

What I have quoted of this letter should never be forgotten. 1st. It proves by his own acknowledgment "that he did not expect to hear from the Committee but *"in reply to such communications as he should make respecting the treaty,"* and yet he has offered to justify his silence on this subject, by saying "he deemed it improper to make any communications to the directory, till they presented their complaints." 2dly. That at the first appearance of the treaty, no objection was made except relative to one article, which in practice has not been detrimental to either France or the United



States, and is not therefore complained of by any body at this day.—3dly. That *there were lights at Philadelphia* by which Mr. Randolph might discover how the treaty would be received at Paris: In other words, that whatever objections should be made by the French faction here, might be expected to be made in France.

On the 10th of September 1795, he again wrote to the Secretary of State, and recommended if any further negociation should be necessary with Great Britain, that the person employed should possess the confidence of France, and should carry on the negociation *where the French should be negotiating on peace, either at Paris or Basle*. Further, he pointed out the way of engaging the zeal of the French Republic by adopting the project of a loan, by attacking Canada and fitting out privateers. It cannot escape notice, on reading this letter, how anxious our minister was that all further negotiation with Britain should be conducted by us *under the eye of France*. In this letter no mention is made that he had heard any complaints against the treaty—\* nor does his next letter, dated 4th October, contain any idea concerning the treaty—†.

On the 20th October 1795, Mr. Monroe acknowledged the receipt of several letters from the Secretary of State, dated 29th May, 1st and 7th June, 2d, 8th, 14th, 21st, 29th, and 30th, July. Several of these letters related to the British treaty, particularly that of the 1st June, which is very lengthy, (consisting of 26 pages of the book) and contained the most ample information and most copious arguments relative to the conduct of the United States in making the treaty; and that of 14th July, accompanying his correspondence with

\* page 215.

† page 223.

Mr. Adet. They were intended to enable our minister to answer all the objections that might be suggested or made by France relative to that treaty. On the 20th October, he was therefore fully instructed by the President how he was to act, and he promised to pay attention to those letters. But even at this period, the following extract from his letter of the 20th October 1795, no complaints had been made against the treaty. "For the present, however, permit me to add, that as yet no complaint has been made to me against the treaty; nor have I heard any thing from the Committee on the subject since the application requesting information, in what light they were to view the reports concerning it, and which was made soon after the treaty was concluded," that is to say in December 1794.

On the 12th September 1795, the Secretary of State, Mr. Pickering, wrote a letter explaining to Mr. Monroe the propriety of the British treaty, the meaning of the particular stipulations, the motives which induced it, and its expected operation—which letter Mr. Monroe answered on the 6th December following. In his answer is to be found this paragraph—"The effect which this incident produced in the councils of this country through its several stages, may be traced in my former communications, to which I beg leave to refer you. *To these I have nothing material new to add.* Symptoms of discontent it is true, are still seen; but whether they will assume an aspect more unpleasant, I know not: If they do, or any thing occurs of sufficient importance to merit your attention, I will certainly apprise you of it, and without delay."

Upon this letter it may be observed, that the effects of the treaty up to that time upon the French councils, were to be traced in his former letters. These I have shortly stated; so that for upwards of a year, the treaty had excited no discontents that Mr. Monroe deemed, as his correspondence states, to be of any consequence.—When they began to appear, he was fully furnished by the Executive with the means of satisfying, or at least of endeavouring to satisfy the Directory of France; for at this period the Directory had gone into office. We are therefore to examine the conduct of our minister from December 1795, till his recall in August 1796—For it is during this space that he is most particularly chargeable with neglect of duty, or of a wilful disregard of the wishes of the Executive respecting the British treaty.

SCIPIO.

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No. XI.

It has been fully established by the letters of Mr. Monroe, that so late as December 1795, no complaint had been made to him by the ruling powers of France, though the treaty had been known and published in the papers at Paris from the middle of August to that time; a space of almost four months. Hence it may be inferred that the suspicions which at first were entertained against the treaty, vanished so soon as it was inspected; and that the Directory saw in it no cause or dissatisfaction, and probably never would have made it a subject of uneasiness, but for the suggestions of Americans. If an enquiry is made, how, and by what means, the French



Republic has been induced of late, to view the treaty in a different light; and to hold it forth as the ostensible cause of that system of injury and depredation which is carried on against American commerce, nothing can be more easily answered.

In a postscript to Mr. Monroe's letter of the 5th November 1795, he informed the Secretary of State as follows: " Mr. Fauchet is lately arrived, and as he appears to be extremely dissatisfied with Mr. Jay's treaty with Great Britain; and is apparently well received by his government, I doubt not his communications on that head will be attended to." This minister of the French Republic, carried with him from America, a thorough knowledge of the opposition which had been excited against the treaty, by the matchless industry of the partizans of France, in every corner of our country. Never was an instrument so misrepresented and so slandered. Some men were so impudent as to say, that the treaty contained any and every thing that occurred to their imagination, which might render it odious. All the passions of America were engaged, and its reason seemed for a moment to have been lost: With the impression which these occurrences occasioned, Mr. Fauchet returned to France. Besides, during his residence here, he had made a personal acquaintance with many leading characters, and especially with those, who now are most distinguished in the fallen faction. He was possessed with all the objections which the advocates for France in our national councils had been able to invent: He was possessed with the reasons, if such they deserve to be called, which senators Burr and Tazewell had taken care to spread upon the journals of the Senate in support of their respective motions to withhold the consent of the Senate, from ratifying the treaty.

Thus informed, thus fortified, thus sustained he would represent in the strongest colours, the unhappy divisions which pervaded the community; and when the Directory found, that there were Americans in number considerable, and in talents and address influential, who were pursuing with zeal and union, a plan to defeat the treaty with Great Britain, and to promote a quarrel with that nation; it was natural, it was unavoidable that they should, with at least equal zeal come forward, and taking their party by the hand, should repeat every objection which had been made on this side the Atlantic: And so they did. Was it to be expected that the Directory would desert the French party here on any occasion? Was it to be supposed they would desert the party, while it was using every exertion to frustrate the treaty, by claiming and exercising the right to refuse the necessary appropriations? Well did Mr. Monroe observe to Secretary Randolph "it is as easy for you, with the lights you have, to form a correct opinion upon that point (meaning the impression made by the treaty in France) in Philadelphia, as for me to do it here." It is a lamentable and undeniable truth that, there has been, and is a perfect concert of action, between the French party here, and the ruling power of France. This is the radical source of the embarrassments, which have occurred in the administration of our public affairs. The faction (which thanks to God has declined to a junto), has had the prudence to agree in their measures, and whatever they have been, they have been abetted and assisted by the French Republic. It is by this policy, which France perfectly understands, and will never neglect, that she has added so largely to

her territory during the present war: and it is this policy which she may be expected to pursue with unremitted assiduity, during the troubles which now threatens the peace of the United States. Against these exertions of France, America must oppose a just sense of her own dignity. She must exclude from her councils, those faithless men, who, whether the dupes or the guides of foreign politics, no longer deserve her confidence; and must defend her injured rights with the spirit of a free, sovereign and independent nation. A state of public affairs is near, or rather is come, when cement is necessary to preserve the union. If a certain party have a distinct object, which I hope they have not, it is a separation of the states; when the southern part is to be put under the care and protection of the French Republic. It is hither their regular and unceasing course of political action has tended. From a lot so disastrous, the Lord save those states.

SCIPIO.

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No. XII.

It was not my intention to remark on any inconsistencies which might appear to me between Mr. Monroe's narrative since his recall, and his letters written at Paris: There is one, however, I must notice. In his narrative written in 1797 after his recall he has ventured to represent that, "the possession of the treaty enabled the French government to judge for itself upon all the points which it involved; and that the effect was not an equi-



vocal one for there did not appear to be a description of persons not in the interest of the coalesced powers, who did not openly and severely censure it."\* In a following page he has stated that, "the appearance of the treaty excited the general disgust of France against the American government which was now diminished by the opposition which the American people made to the treaty." Already I have cited his letter of 17th August, written soon after the treaty appeared at Paris; and his letter of 20th October, which expressly contradicts this representation. If, however, it is to be believed that Mr. Monroe has more truly stated the impressions of France, at the sight of the treaty in his narrative of 1797 than in his letters of 1795, it will follow that he will appear in a more culpable light than I have been disposed to view him. It will prove that he so much the longer neglected those friendly explanations which it was his duty to have offered respecting the treaty. From his correspondence it appears that not only after the treaty appeared at Paris, but even after he had received in October 1795 the instructions of the President, he did not solicit an audience of the Directory on this subject till the 5th March 1796, a space of fifteen months from the conclusion of the treaty and about seven months after it had been published in Paris, and four months after he had received the copious comments on the treaty, from the Secretary of State, contained in his letter of June, and the answer to Mr. Adet's objections. Nor did Mr. Monroe desire an audience before he had been told by the minister of foreign affairs that, the directory *had made up its mind* how to act concerning the treaty. That he should

have been an indifferent spectator to the discontented feelings of France before, and while it was coming to a mature determination, and should, immediately after he was informed that such a determination was taken, request an audience of the Directory on the subject; must be admitted to be strong evidence, not only of negligence but of incapacity. Let it be noted that, neither his letter of 22d December 1795, nor that of 26th January 1796, contained a word on the treaty.

In his letter of 16th February 1796, he has informed the Secretary of State, that he had called the day before, on the minister of foreign affairs to represent the distresses of several of his countrymen, but before he was allowed to enter on the subject, his attention was called to the treaty, by the minister of foreign affairs, who observed "*the Directory had at length made up its mind, how to act concerning our treaty with England*"; that it considered the alliance between us as ceasing to exist, from the moment the treaty was ratified; and had, or should appoint an envoy extraordinary, to represent the same to our government, &c. that he should hand to me an official note on this subject, being ordered to do so by the Directory."\* &c. Mr. Monroe further confirmed that as no specific objection was made, he could make no specific reply: That he expressed his astonishment at the measure proposed, inculcated the propriety of candour in discussing the treaty; and intended to demand an audience, for the purpose of diverting France from the measure.

On the 20th of February he wrote that, he had asked and obtained a conference with the minister of foreign affairs, concerning the mission of an

Envoy to America; that he had remonstrated against the measure, and had declared that he was always ready to enter into explanations relative to the treaty, "*when required, and would do it with pleasure*;" to which the minister replied that, France had much cause of complaint against us, *independently of our treaty* with England, but that by this treaty, ours with them was annihilated; but admitted that the objections to the mission of an Envoy to America, which had been urged, had much force in them, and should be considered. It is added in this letter that he (Mr Monroe) expected he might be called on for explanations of the treaty, *in which* case he should avail himself in the best manner of the communications he had received from the department of State.

The plan of sending an Envoy to America was laid aside and, whether the opposition of Mr. Monroe to this measure was judicious or not, I will not venture to decide. It is probable however, it would not have made things worse with this country than we now find them; and our explanations and arguments would have been as ably urged in Philadelphia as any where else. But if Mr. Monroe had already been guilty of unwarrantable negligence in permitting the directory to make up its mind without any previous discussion, or representation of the treaty in our behalf, this negligence became inexcusable and fatal, by his subsequent conduct. Instead of telling the minister of foreign affairs, he was ready *when required* by the French Republic, to give explanations on this subject; he ought to have sent him immediately, a written communication, embracing every particular which he had heard, or believed might have occasioned any dissatisfaction. Let it be remembered, Mr. Monroe



in his letter of the 17th August 1795 had told the President he expected *to hear no complaints, unless in reply to his representations*. With this opinion, if Mr. Monroe believed that France was well satisfied with the United States, it would have been proper to observe silence on the treaty: but if he was acquainted with its discontent, and found it from time to time encreasing, as the documents prove, or as he acknowledges in his narrative; and if he believed the French Republic would not express to him any sentiments on that subject, *but in reply to his observations*, he was bound in duty to commence an explanation. If this could not be done verbally, it should have been put in writing which it was not in the power of the French cabinet to prevent. There was no other way for endeavouring to remove the uneasiness of France, but by actually commencing the discussion on his part, and not merely by *declaring his willingness* to enter upon it. This would have been executing the expectations of the Executive, whose anxious and unceasing wish to preserve harmony between the two countries had been on all occasions testified to him. If these endeavours had been unsuccessful, though it would have been the source of infinite regret, it would have afforded a consolatory reflection, that every thing had been done that was possible to obtain success. He ought not so long to have remained in Paris, a passive witness to the growing discontent of France, without making some exertion to diminish or remove it. All the remedies which the Executive could supply, were in his hands, and certainly he ought to have tried their efficacy in due season, and not have deferred their application till the disease had probably become incurable.

It is true that in March Mr. Monroe did demand an audience of the Directory, which was granted. That having demanded the audience, he was obliged to open the conference, that the result was that they ordered their minister of foreign affairs to send a note of their complaints to the American minister, which was done soon afterwards, and to which Mr. Monroe returned an answer. But all this was entirely out of season—it was a month after the Directory had determined of their course of conduct as they had expressly informed him.

I will not say that any thing that Mr. Monroe could have done, would have diverted France from her present offensive and unjust system. The people of the United States are descendants from the British, and though separate and independent in government, yet speaking the same language, alike in manners, connected by commerce, and professing the christian religion, the French are led to contemplate us as Englishmen, and from their hatred to England, are not sparing of their injuries to us. But surely Mr. Monroe ought to have *used his endeavours*, with vigilance, constancy and sincerity; and he should have used them in due season, and with his utmost ability, to correct the erroneous opinions and to dissipate the unfavourable prejudices which the treaty might have excited. From the Executive he had in due time received the fullest directions, and had been not only reminded how to regulate his future conduct, but had been reprov'd for some instances of his misconduct, so early as the 23d November, 1795. The Secretary of State wrote him a short letter of which the following is an extract. “I write now merely to acknowledge the receipt of your several letters

numbered 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21. You will see an answer to the last has been anticipated by a long letter from me dated in September, on the subject of the treaty between the United States and Great Britain. *By that letter you will understand, that the ideas you have detailed, are quite foreign to the views of the Government of the United States.*"\* Even this did not stimulate him to action, but it was reserved for the minister of foreign affairs to rouse him from his lethargy, by telling him positively that France had at length made up its mind how to act concerning the British treaty. After this period it might have been foreseen that his representations would be unavailing, and so they were. The proper season had passed by, unimproved, and it was never to be recalled. The discontent of France was grown to maturity, and what might have been only a transient prejudice, was become a fixed opinion.

SCIPIO.

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No. XIII.

It would be neither useful nor entertaining to remark on the communications which passed between our minister and the directory, relative to the British treaty, *after they had told him they had made up their mind how to act.* He seems to have been afraid to represent the sentiments of the Executive on this subject; apprehending they might be disagreeable to the directory, and make them suspect his personal devotion to their will, which on so many oc-

\* page 319.



easions he had manifested. By this timidity, he must have contributed to alarm their jealousy, and not to appease it. While he pretended to justify and support the Executive in respect to the treaty, he appears to have distrusted the goodness of his cause, and by this diffidence to have animated the discontent of France. I shall pass over the uncertainties, contrarieties and idle conjectures to be found in his letters to the Secretary of State. They may have been meant to keep the mind of the President in anxious and painful suspense, or they may have been designed to leave the ex-minister at full liberty, at a future day, to join in supporting that nation in demanding an abrogation of the treaty with Britain. If he has so dubiously, so jesuitically, so insincerely defended the measures of America in relation to foreign nations, and particularly the treaty with Britain, that he can now, without inconsistency advocate the proceedings of France; all men must agree, he has been the unfaithful representative of the United States. Will any person doubt after reading Mr. Monroe's pamphlet, on which side he now stands in the controversy between France and his native country. He has avowed his object in his publication to be, to denounce the Executive for what he calls injustice and perfidy towards France. He has recapitulated no less than fourteen charges to make good his denunciation, running over a period of several years which embraces the whole space of his ministry at Paris. Is it possible that Mr. Monroe could have truly and cordially *endeavoured* to fulfil the views of the President as the minister of the United States to the French republic, if he differed from him in sentiment, and disapproved of his measures or suspected his objects? How can it be reconciled, that he

remained more than two years in a ministry subject to the direction of the President, and for aught that appears, would have willingly remained for ever if in his power; and that when he has been recalled, he has written a book of accusations against his employer, in which he endeavours to prove that, relative to France, the Executive has been either unwise, or unjust, or dishonourable, and has furnished just cause for the complaints of that nation? After this, is it surprising that citizen Barras, President of the directory, in the valedictory delivered to Mr. Monroe at his taking leave of France, should have taken that occasion to pronounce an invective against our President, and an eulogy on our minister? Did not this demonstrate that the directory believed the sentiments of the minister and of the President to be at variance, and that the former had been subservient to the views of France? Else, why were the directory disposed to permit Mr. Monroe always to remain in his ministry, why have they refused, not only to receive, but even to hear his successor, Gen. Pinckney, than whom, no American truly attached to the good of his country, could be less exceptionable—why, at this moment have our three envoys been so long delayed, or perhaps sent back without an audience? To them no personal objection has been, or can be made. The only answer that occurs to me, to these questions is, that France, having so long been indulged with a minister more useful to it, than to America; a minister who did every thing to inspire the directory with confidence in him, but nothing to inspire them with confidence in the Executive, a minister who recommended himself to that, in proportion as he disregarded the interests of this government, was displeased at his recall, and may

have taken up the opinion that she is intitled to have at all times a minister from America, equally condescending, obsequious and submissive. In the present disagreement between the two nations, if an argument more forcible than the rest to support the act of the Executive in removing this minister was sought for, the panegyric of citizen Barras on our minister's conduct would furnish it.

To confirm the statement which I have made of Mr. Monroe's negligence respecting the British treaty, I must present to the public an extract from the letter of the secretary of state to him, dated 13th June, 1795. It is as follows: "But the principal matter which now demands attention is what concerns the late treaty between the United States and Great Britain.

"Of the views of the government of the United States on this subject, you have long since been possessed as well before as subsequent to its ratification. These views were communicated to you for the sole purpose of furnishing you with the means of removing objections and dispelling jealousies. By your own representations both objections and jealousies existed. It has been therefore a matter of no small surprize to the President, that during so long a period you contented yourself merely with having those means in your possession without applying them to the object for which they were transmitted.

"As early as October last *you predicted* that if Mr. Jay's treaty should be ratified, it would excite great discontent in France. Early in November you mentioned the arrival of Mr. Fauchet extremely dissatisfied with the treaty; adding that he was well received and would therefore be attended to. On the 6th December you acknowledge the re-



ceipt of my letter of September 12th, written subsequently to the ratification of the treaty, to repeat and further explain the principles and views of the government concerning it. Mr. Adet's objections to the treaty and their refutation accompanied my letter. And with such means in your hands, means amply sufficient to vindicate the conduct of the United States, not less regret than surprize is excited that no attempt was made to apply them to the highly important use for which they were sent. Although you anticipated discontents, although the symptoms of discontent appeared, although these symptoms unattended to and unallayed might increase to an inflammation, and Mr. Fauchet's arrival with all his dissatisfaction and prejudices about him would assuredly add to the irritation; yet you were silent and inactive, until on the 15th February you were alarmed by the project of the Directory accidentally communicated to you by the minister of foreign affairs of sending to this country an envoy extraordinary to represent to our government their decision concerning the treaty with Great Britain, "that they considered the treaty of alliance between us as ceasing to exist from the moment the treaty was ratified." Your letter of the 20th of the same month, describes your second interview with the minister on the project of sending an envoy extraordinary, and the reasons you urged to dissuade them from it, were certainly very cogent. Your letter of the 10th March, informs us the project was laid aside, and your letter of the 25th of March, that you had an audience of the Directory on the subject, and that they had agreed to suspend their proposed extraordinary mission, until the points in question should be discussed between you and the minister for foreign affairs.

*The result of this audience appears satisfactory, and from the good effect produced by the partial explanations then given, may be calculated the happy consequences of the full communications which might have been made, and which for so long a time you had possessed the means of making, in vindication of the government you represent. That these were not made, that they had not been made even so late as the 25th of March, is again to be extremely regretted, because the justice the honour and the faith of our country, were questioned, and consequently their most important interests were at stake.\** This document shall close the illustration of this instance of Mr. Monroe's misconduct—In justifying himself, it is true he has stated that he conceived it most prudent, to observe silence on this topic, which he terms remaining on the defensive : but in a case like this, what sort of defence was silence ? Did silence dispel jealousies ? Did silence efface the misconceptions which had been produced by the wicked misrepresentations of the treaty, so industriously invented, and reiterated on this side the water, by the French faction ? Did silence vindicate the justice and honour of America, from the vile aspersions thrown on both, not only by some of our citizens, but even by members of our legislative bodies ? Did silence vindicate the executive from the infinite calumnies which were circulated by the editor of the Aurora, the *confidential friend and correspondent* of citizen Monroe ? Or was not silence the part which by the French faction, was prescribed to him to act, as best calculated to weaken and embarrass the administration of our own government and to promote their turbulent and vicious projects.

SCIPIO.

\* page 365.

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No. XIV.

Whoever shall be at the trouble of reading the documents which Mr. Monroe has annexed to his pamphlet, and caused to be published by his confidential friend Bache, will learn from them whether, the various instances of misconduct which have been the subject of my observations are not fully substantiated. Let them be repeated :

1st. It appears that he did misrepresent to the Committee of Public Safety, that he was not authorized by the President to complain of the decree of the French Republic, derogatory of our treaty with France, which would naturally make an impression that the Executive either neglected the rights and interests of the citizens of the United States or were afraid to complain of the injuries and spoliations done to their persons and property; an impression no less dishonourable to the President, than mischievous to our commercial fellow-citizens.

2d. It appears that he did of his own head inform the Committee, if a departure from the treaty was found on experience advantageous to France "his government and the people in general of his country, would bear with it not only with patience but with pleasure," by which abject and unauthorized declaration he has in some measure contributed to bring on our commerce, the ruinous system of depredation under which it has been, and now is suffering.

3d. It appears that he did misrepresent the mission of Mr. Jay when he asserted that it was limited exclusively, to two objects, the delivery of the western posts, and compensation for injuries



to our commerce, by which means he laid the foundation for certain disappointments and dissatisfaction on the part of France, with whatever treaty might be made between this country and Great Britain.

4th. It appears that he did contrary to his duty, promised to communicate to the Committee the treaty negotiated by Mr. Jay so soon as it was in his power, and did endeavour to obtain a copy for that purpose before it could have been laid before the President of the United States, by sending a special messenger to London for it.

5th. It appears that he did encourage the project of a loan of a considerable sum of money to be advanced on the credit of the United States, to enable France to prosecute the present war, relying on the promise of France to reimburse it if it should be at a future day able; a measure incompatible with the continuance of our state of neutrality, which was the course that the Executive had determined, with the approbation of America to pursue; a measure, that, by depriving the United States of their own resources when most wanted, would have made them completely dependent on the fortune and will of France.

6th. It appears that he did neglect to use, seasonably and diligently, the means put in his power by the President for explaining his conduct relative to the British treaty, and for dispelling the prejudices and obviating the discontent which, from the extraordinary exertions of the French faction in the United States, it was supposed, might be excited in France.

I have omitted, and shall omit to mention the other matters of inferior consequence, which, ac-

cording to the documents, exhibit our minister in an unfavourable point of view as they tend to shew his constant desire to recommend France to the affections of our fellow-citizens; and to excuse and palliate those acts of injustice of which we have had so much cause to complain, his zeal to make himself agreeable to France, his indifference to the sentiments of the Executive, and his undue preference of the interests of France to all other objects. With the blind and infatuated party who take side with France against America, these traits are deemed meritorious: with such persons Mr. Monroe is welcome to all the merit that his late ministry can entitle him. It was because I considered him as one of them, as he himself has avowed, that I read his book, which contains that system of attack on our present government, deemed by the party, best calculated to introduce important changes.—As it contains a great deal of his correspondence upon matters unconnected with a vindication of himself, or an accusation of his employer, the late President of the United States, I should not have persevered through the tedious task, but from a desire to be truly informed, from the documents themselves, and from an intention, if the narrative appeared unsupported by them, to offer to the public my reflections on his conduct. It was to be expected that, this dismissed officer, writing under the influence of resentment, would endeavour to exhibit in an odious view, the wise and virtuous statesman who has just retired from the helm; and I am sure no person will say his narrative is deficient of the malevolent spirit which has characterised the publications of the party, and especially, those that are printed by his *friend Bache*.

Let me explain what is meant by saying that this book is a part of the system of attack upon our present government, from which the French party expect to produce important changes.

It cannot have escaped the observation of the intelligent part of society, that they, who were opposed to our present government at its institution, have generally, after finding their efforts unavailing, which were made to its first operations, and after finding the affections of the people towards it, not only attached, but encreasing, *pretended* to be satisfied with the constitution; that they have changed their opposition, as they say, from the government to the administration. It is also well known, that they have been invariably in concert with the French cabinet; and that Mr. Genet was *instructed* to attempt to produce some alterations in our government; and if, on his arrival the circumstances of the country were unfavourable to such attempts, that they might be deferred to a more convenient opportunity: I refer to his instructions published by himself in 1794. It is notorious, that whatever has been done in France, by the ruling power of the day, was approved and justified so soon as it was known by the French faction here; and that whatever the French faction has from time to time attempted or avowed here, has been maintained and advocated by the ruling power there. This harmony for so many years has not proceeded from accident: It has been the result of a combination between the opposition leaders here, who are desirous to be in power, and the French cabinet, who are ambitious to regulate the affairs of America, as well as of Europe. The business is well understood on both sides, and this union is founded on



the ambition of both. Rather than not have the administration in their hands, which might give an influence to be used in creating radical changes in the constitution suited to their ideas; they are willing to obtain it by the aid of a foreign nation, which is willing to bestow its aid to men that are expected to be subservient if not devoted to its will. With this object plainly before them, their steps have been directed thither without looking to the right or to the left.

When the late President had demonstrated, as every act of his administration did demonstrate, his invariable policy to preserve the United States in their independence: and that he never would be the tool of France *in tacking* them to her, as a province in fact, however they might be in name; from that time it became a maxim in the French councils, that the confidence and affection of the people in George Washington was to be destroyed. It was foreseen by this combination that, so long as the public should believe their confidence and affection well placed in him, his measures, and the persons most active in maintaining them would be esteemed: Consequently, that his system would be likely to be continued, and the administration confided to men who had approved that system. That the weight of President Washington's services might be diminished or taken away, calumny and falsehood have been at work day and night—certain Gazettes in our country have teemed with every malevolent fiction that could be devised against him, and not content with taking Editors of Gazettes into pay, it may be believed the French Republic have hired several writers to criminate, revile and libel the conduct of our late President, of whom Tom Paine and Fauchet deserve to be particularly noticed.

Some of these writers have expressed their motive to be, to convince the people that, as a general he scarcely deserved well of his country, and that as a statesman his administration has been unwise, wicked, ungrateful and perfidious: That they have been under unaccountable prejudices in his favor, which must be removed to save their liberties and that all who have sustained his administration, have like him, been traitors to our country, and ought to be discarded from their confidence.

This is the form of attack now carrying on in which Mr. Monroe by publishing his book is conceived to have taken a part, and in which Tom Paine has already made his appearance. Connected with this subject, I shall draw the attention of the public to the letters of Tom Paine, written at Paris to President Washington, while the writer resided in the house of the American minister.

SCIPIO.

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No. XV.

It was on the authority of Tom Paine that I asserted that he *certainly* resided with Mr. Monroe at Paris in the year 1795, when he wrote two letters to President Washington, and that *probably* he was there when he wrote a third, dated 30th July, 1796—The two former are dated 22d February and 20th September 1795, and in the last are to be found the following sentences, “After the Robespierrian members of the committee were removed by the expiration of their time of serving, Mr. Monroe reclaimed me and I was liberated the 4th of No-

vember." Immediately upon my liberation Mr. Monroe invited me to his house, where I remained more than a year and a half, and I speak of his aid and friendship as an open hearted man will always do in such a case with respect and gratitude—\*

Though the year is not expressed when Tom Paine was liberated, it was in 1794, as will appear by Mr. Monroe's letters dated 1st Nov. 1794 and 13th January, 1795.† As then he resided more than a year and a half from the 4th November 1794 in the house of the American minister, he was certainly there in February and September 1795, and most probably in July 1796 when the last letter was written.—The first mentioned of these letters, it is true, when it was shewn to Mr. Monroe was desired to be recalled, which was for that time accordingly done, but was afterwards sent in 1796. More than 15 months after the date of this letter, Tom Paine was permitted to live with the American minister as one of his family upon terms of familiar friendship, instead of which treatment he ought to have been in my opinion forbid his house. In it he reproached the President for not interposing his exertions to obtain his liberation from the imprisonment inflicted by the ruling power of France, which he attributed wholly to his desire to keep him at a distance from the United States, "because (as he says) the presence of a man who might disapprove of the administration, and who had credit enough with the country to be heard and believed, was not wished." In it he inveighed also against the proclamation of neutrality and censured the conduct of Mr. Jay in his negotiation and some other steps of the Executive.

\* page 25 of the letter.

† page 100.



The letter of the 20th September 1795, is concise, impudent, insolent, infamous. In this he demanded copies of whatever the President had written respecting him, either in his public or private letters, and concluded in the following words, "I ought not to have suspected you of treachery, but whether I recover from the illness I now suffer or not, I shall continue to think you treacherous till you give me cause to think otherwise. I am sure you would have found yourself more at your ease, had you acted by me as you ought: for whether your desertion of me was intended to gratify the English government, or to let me fall into destruction in France that you might exclaim the louder against the French revolution; or whether you hoped by my extinction to meet with less opposition in mounting up the American government, either of these will involve you in reproach you will not easily shake off." Let it be remembered that Tom Paine when he wrote this letter had resided almost a year under the roof of the American minister, was then resident under the same roof, and for many months afterwards continued to reside there.

The last letter of Tom Paine to President Washington is dated 30th July 1796, when most *probably* he was still enjoying the friendly hospitality of the American minister. It consists of upwards of fifty pages and comprehends the two former which are made parts of it. These three letters were sent to the Editor of the Aurora, the libel-printer against the late President and his measures, and the friend of the American minister, in order that they might be published\*. Some extracts may

\* In calling the editor of the Aurora the friend of Mr. Monroe, I feel myself authorized by the letter of the latter to Mr. Logan, which has lately been printed in Virginia, in which Mr. Bache is said to possess the confidence of Mr. Monroe.

be seen in the Aurora I believe, and the whole in a pamphlet which was printed by him in the fall of 1796, when the minds of our citizens were drawn to the choice of a successor to the President of the United States who had previously published his determination to retire. It is well known to every body that in the contest at the late election for President, the real political question to be decided was whether the Washingtonian system of administration should be continued or not, which system was too independent to be pleasing to France. The French Republic was intent on raising to the helm Mr. Jefferson, who was deemed by it, *and as appears since from his reputed letter to Mazzei* was justly deemed, hostile to that political system, if not to the constitution itself of the United States. The following is an extract from this almost incredible but ever memorable letter to Mazzei. "Our political situation is prodigiously changed since you left us. Instead of that noble love of liberty and *that republican government*, which carried us triumphantly thro' the dangers of the war, an anglo-monarchico-aristocratic party, has arisen. Their avowed object is to impose on us the substance, as they have already given us the form of the British government, &c." The only important change of government to which the writer alluded, was from the old confederation to *the present constitution*, which is like (as he says) to the British government, and is not republican. Of course he cannot be expected to love or revere it, if this is his real opinion of our constitution, unless indeed he be not truly the republican which he wishes to be thought. How can a republican love a government that is not republican? How can a man love a thing most like the object of his hatred. In what manner

will Mr. Jefferson support a constitution which he abhors.

This letter also adds, "it is sufficient that we guard ourselves and that we break the Lilliputian ties by which they have bound us in the first slumbers which succeeded our labours." What does this mean? What are the *Lilliputian ties* which the author means. As I conceive, the ties of the constitution, and none else can be understood. Moreover, the letter says, "we have against us *the Executive power, the judiciary power*, all the officers of government, and all who are seeking offices, all timid men. Need it be asked who is or can be meant by the Executive power, but the President of the United States. In short, what does this sentence mean but that the whole administration, the President, the judges and all the other officers are opposed to republican government and attached to monarchy and are ready to destroy the liberties of America. Lastly, the writer observes, "it suffices that *we* arrest the progress of that system of ingratitude and injustice towards France from which *they* would alienate us, to bring us under British influence, &c." I shall not permit myself to comment on these passages of the letter to Mazzei. But I do not now hesitate to say that I believe, and that it is generally believed, that this letter was written by Mr. Jefferson. If genuine, it surely proves that the expectations of France were well founded. For a long time before the election all Frenchmen, all *American democrats*, and all malcontents had fixed on him to succeed to the Presidential authority and had made this the grand object of their political pursuits. From local and other considerations, many of our good citizens were disposed to favour his election also, at that time believing him more



attached to the constitution and less opposed to the Washingtonian administration, than they are now from subsequent information authorized to believe.

To promote the election of this gentleman, all means were, it is believed called into action, which were in the power of the French republic. From this cause proceeded the last letter of Tom Paine to President Washington, to which I have referred, a letter that is become very notorious, and is known by the appellation of the *infamous letter of Tom Paine*: It made its appearance at a time when it might impress the public opinion against any who wished for a continuance of the system on which President Washington had administered the government. Soon after this, other publications of the same tendency were made; nor was any time thought so suitable for Mr. Adet to publish the angry manifesto of the French republic, as when, in the state of Pennsylvania the people were about to give their votes for electors of the President of the United States. It was on the votes of this state, which, from the operation of the law were almost certain of being all on the same side, that the election was supposed to depend. That the manifesto had a sensible effect on some of the inhabitants of our city of the society of friends, is not to be doubted.

In this letter Tom Paine declares himself "opposed to almost the whole of his (Washington's) administration, and promises to prove it to have been deceitful, if not perfidious, as well as unjust in respect to France." This is what Mr. Monroe in his book does in substance undertake to prove: This too is the opinion which is contained in the letter to Mazzei; and this is the charge that the French republic, by her functionaries has often

repeated. That the people should believe that this charge is well founded, and that their confidence and affection were misplaced in their former President, is deemed an important preliminary, to the success of their plan of bringing about a change in the present administration, and perhaps in the constitution. Some of the writers avow this sentiment in express terms, and Tom Paine declares his wish to change the constitution in some instances which are mentioned in the letter.

Upon the *political topics* which are embraced in Tom Paine's letters, it must be observed that his opinions are consonant with those of Mr. Monroe on the same subjects as they are expressed in the letters and narrative of the latter. The similarity of ideas, and in a few instances of expressions, is so striking that the reader would naturally believe that the two authors held a free communion of sentiments with each other, while they had lived under the same roof. As it would be tedious to make quotations to prove this, I shall rely on the candor of those who shall read both, for the accuracy of the remark: nor shall I quote from the letter the many opprobrious and slanderous expressions which run throughout it, and which call forth the indignation of every honest man in every quarter of the world: But as I have adverted to the patronage afforded by Mr. Monroe, in his own house, to Tom Paine, for the space of more than eighteen months, while he was there writing insolent letters to President Washington, to be communicated through the medium of Bache's *Aurora*, designed to injure the reputation of the President, to promote the views of the French republic in regard to his successor; to strengthen the French faction among us, to shake the confidence of the people in all those who approve and support.

ed the Washington system, from a conviction that it was the wisest and best for the common happiness. I must not, cannot forbear to present to public consideration the last paragraph of that last and most infamous letter.—From this sample well may be imagined the rest. It is as follows, “this is the ground upon which America now stands. All her rights of commerce and navigation have to commence anew, and that with the loss of character to begin with. If there is sense of shame enough left in the heart to call a blush into the cheek, the Washington administration must be ashamed to appear—and as to you, Sir, treacherous in private friendship (for so you have been to me, and that, in the day of danger) and *a hypocrite in public life*, the world will be puzzled to decide whether you are an apostate or an impostor; whether you have abandoned good principles, or whether you ever had any;” Who would have thought it possible that the author of this paragraph had been the companion of the American minister in his own house at Paris for more than eighteen months immediately before his writing it, or when he wrote it? It has been proved, and who can deny it after reading the proofs? In addition to the instances of misconduct in his ministry which have been specified and in aggravation of them, Mr. Monroe while American minister is proved to have been the patron of Tom Paine the libel writer, and the confidential friend of Bache the libel printer, against the President and his administration.

From the single motive of doing good, I have submitted my view of our late minister's conduct, arising principally from the documents which he has published. Ought the patron of Tom Paine, ought the friend of Bache, ought the man who had committed the acts of misconduct to which I have adverted, ought the man who possessed the confi-



dence of the opposition party in this Country and of the French Rulers which he endeavoured to acquire by his subserviency, ought the man who paid more deference to the judgment of the French faction which probably coincided with his own, than to the opinions and sentiments of your President. Ought such a man to have been continued as minister of the United States to the French republic? Ought his immediate associates in politics any longer to be countenanced. Ought they not all be abandoned as insidious enemies to the public weal, to the *union*, felicity and independence of these United States.

SCIPIO.

MR. FENNO,

A letter of Mr. Monroe to Mr. Logan which has lately appeared in the Virginia gazette, is requested to be annexed to the pamphlet containing the reflections on Monroe's view which is said now to be in the press, as it throws some light on the political sentiments of that gentleman.

Having referred to the letter of Mr. Jefferson to Mazzei, it seems necessary to republish it also in the appendix to that pamphlet—Let it appear before the public fully and truly and let our fellow citizens have an opportunity impartially to consider it and pass their opinion on the writer. For my part I have joined in the opinion that he is the soul of the Jacobins of America: and that he is to be considered as the source of that spirit of party which distracts the councils of the nation. When he holding the office of Secretary of State, patronized a gazette under the conduct of his clerk Freneau, with the avowed object to expose the measures of the executive and of Congress to the hatred of the people, he then commenced the opposition to the present government which has been carried to so alarming a height as to threaten the disunion of the states: He then in my opinion laid the foundation for the insurrection which broke out in the western country, that has cost the United States nearly two millions of dollars: He then taught the opponents to our government, how to mislead and deceive the people, how to excite their jealousies and to create their prejudices against the views of the administrators of the government, as well as of the legislature. He then invited France, to apply to us the maxim, *divide & impera*. He then held with Mr. Genet two languages, one as secretary of state; another as Thomas Jefferson, and to fix the

confidence of France and the opposition party in him, he retired from the office of Secretary of State. He retired at a critical juncture, when the political ship was in imminent danger, and gave that best proof of his devotion to Jacobinism. From that time the opposition has never ceased ; and none ought to be surprised that the same man who was the father of the opposition faction, should entertain the sentiments which he has expressed to Mazzei : and still less ought any to be surprised that although Vice President he should at this time recommend Bache's gazette as the most proper to be read by his acquaintances and friends, a gazette that is supposed by many not only to be under the direction of the French republic, but is admitted to be devoted to the purposes of opposing the operations of the general government—The conduct of so elevated an officer cannot pass unobserved. All that is desired of my fellow citizens is to behold it as it really has been, and is ; and to judge for themselves whether he has not been *pernicious* and is not now *dangerous* to the tranquillity, security and union of this country.

SCIPIO.



TO Mr. LOGAN.

*Paris, June 24th, 1795.*

DEAR SIR,

I give you within a short sketch of the actual state of things here, a copy of which I likewise send to one or two other friends of whom *Mr. Beckley* is one. If you and *Mr. Beckley*, in Philadelphia, deem it worthy the attention, I have no objection to your inserting it in *Bache's Paper*, the first paragraph excepted, and if you likewise approve, I will hereafter keep you regularly apprized of the course of events, whereby the community at large may be more correctly informed of the progress of the Revolution than they heretofore have been or can be, from the English prints. The character will be, "from a youth in Paris to his friend in Philadelphia,"—occasionally varied, as from some other quarter, as Bourdeaux, that it may not appear to be a regular thing: though in that respect act as you please, for as truths only will be communicated and with temperance it is imaterial what the conjecture is provided it be only conjecture.

You promised me a visit: cannot you yet make it, as we shall be very happy to see you and *Mrs. Logan* and will certainly make your time as comfortable as possible. In your absence *Mr. Beckley* can attend to the little object of my communications, for I wish you and him to act in concert whilst he is in that neighbourhood, and indeed if you were both absent you will arrange matters confidentially with *Mr. B.* himself, who likewise possesses mine.

I beg you to present my respects to *Drs. Rittenhouse* and *Rush*, and that you believe me sincerely,

Your friend and servant,

*JAMES MONROE.*

FLORENCE, January 1, 1797.

## LETTER

*From Mr. Jefferson, late minister of the United States in France, and secretary to the department of foreign affairs, to a citizen of Virginia.*

This letter, is addressed to M. Mazzei, author of *Researches, historical and political, upon the United States of America*, now resident in Tuscany and is literally translated, as follows.

“ Our political situation is prodigiously changed since you left us. Instead of that noble love of liberty, and that republican government, which carried us triumphantly through the dangers of the war, an anglo—monarchico—aristocratic party has arisen. Their avowed object is to impose on us the *substance*, as they have already given us the *form* of the British government. Nevertheless the principal body of our citizens remain faithful to republican principles. All our proprietors of lands are friendly to those principles, as also the mass of men of talents. We have against us (republicans) the *executive power*, the *judiciary power*, (two of three branches of our government) *all the officers of government, all who are seeking offices, all timid men who prefer the calm of despotism to the tempestuous sea of liberty, the British merchants and the Americans who trade on British capitals, the speculators, persons interested in the bank and the public funds.* [Establishments invented with views of corruption, and to assimilate us to the British model in its corrupt parts.]

“ I should give you a fever, if I should name the apostates who have embraced these heresies; men who were Solomons in council, and Sampsons in

combat, but whose hair has been cut off by the whore of England. [In the original, *par le catin d'Angleterre*, probably alluding to the woman's cutting off the hair of Sampson, and his loss of strength thereby.]

"They would wrest from us that liberty which we have obtained by so much labour and peril; but we shall preserve it. Our mass of weight and riches is so powerful, that we have nothing to fear from any attempt against us by force. It is sufficient that we guard ourselves, and that *we break the Lilliputian ties* by which they have bound us, in the first slumbers which succeeded our labours. It suffices that we arrest the progress of that system of ingratitude and injustice towards France, from which they would alienate us, to bring us under British influence, &c."

[The foregoing letter wears all the external marks of authenticity. And yet it seems hardly possible an American could be capable of writing such a letter. As the letter is circulating in Europe, we deem it just, if a forgery, to give Mr. Jefferson an opportunity to disavow it.]





